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ABSTRACT 
Property market is definitely one of the most pop topic in Hong Kong over the 
years. It has undoubtedly drawn much attention over the past few years. Traditional 
Chinese culture emphasises the importance of owning a house or a flat. Besides, many 
people consider the property market as a nice place for investment，further increasing 
the demand for real-estates. While many people have invested in housing, very few 
can really afford a once-ofF payment for their property investment and most people rely 
on mortgage loan as the primary source of financing. In fact, mortgage loan makes up 
nearly 50% of the local banks' loan portfolio. It is estimated that the outstanding 
mortgage loan amounts to HK$ 420 Billion. 
The development of the mortgage backed securities market in Hong Kong will 
start in mid-1997 with the set-up of a mortgage corporation and other necessary 
infrastructures by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority ( HKMA ). HKMA's prime 
objectives are increasing the flow of investment funds and diversifying mortgage-
lending institutions' risk exposure to the property market. Securitization of mortgage 
loans will bring a new type of financial instrument and it is important to understand its 
impact on the real-estate market, financial market, banking system, investors and 
lenders. This project aims at considering and predicting the various effects that the 
mortgage backed securities project will bring to the domestic market. We will also 
comment on the HKMA's plan for the development of mortgage backed securities 
market in Hong Kong. 
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The project will proceed with an in-depth discussion on the characteristics and 
operations of mortgage backed securities. A review on the characteristics of Hong 
Kong mortgage market will be done since this is one of the most important condition 
which will determine if the mortgage backed securities market can be successfiilly 
created. After that, a thorough comparison ofHong Kong with other major countries 
implementing mortgage backed securities ( e.g. USA and Japan ) will be carried out. 
An analysis will then be made to the mortgage backed securities market development 
plan by the HKMA. To better understand the products' market acceptance, we will 
conduct a questionnaire survey covering most of the potential key players in the 
mortgage backed securities market. The objective of the project will be on knowing 
the response of the public and on giving recommendations for successful development 
of mortgage backed securities market in Hong Kong. 
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Securitization and Secondary Mortgage Market 
Mortgage-backed security is a financial innovation which becomes popular in 
the recent decade. In this section, we will take a look at mortgage securitization and 
the characteristics of various types of mortgage-backed securities, which are essential 
for further study of the MBS development process. 
Securitization 
Securitization is the process of issuing marketable securities backed by the 
expected cash flows from specific financial assets. A financial institution engaging in 
asset securitization is responsible for structuring and marketing the securities, but the 
institution's responsibilities for the payments on them are limited. The attractiveness 
of the securities is to a large extent independent of the credit rating of the origination 
institution. Investor's assessment usually depends (1) on the capacity of the underlying 
assets to generate cash flows required for meeting the contractual principal and interest 
payments, (2) and the degree of protection incorporated in the structure of the security 
itself. 
Securitization allows issuing institutions to engage in long-term lending at fixed 
rates while avoiding the kind ofinterest rate mismatches that would occur ifaportfolio 
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of long-term assets were funded with shorter-term deposits. Institution transfers the 
market risks inherent in long-term assets to the investors with these securities. At the 
same time, investors can acquire an attractive long-term fixed-rate asset without the 
large operational costs of establishing a retail lending business. 
Residential mortgages, credit card receivables, automobile loans and other 
consumer receivables are mostly often seen for securitization. Usually, these assets are 
found in large homogeneous pools for which historical data can be used to estimate 
probable default rates, which is a very important characteristics of securitization. 
Securities backed or "collateralised" by residential mortgages are called ''mortgage-
hacked securities” ( MBS ). The term “asset-backed securities” ( ABS ) refers to 
securities backed by any asset except mortgages. 
In the process of securitization, a secondary market agency is usually created ( 
by the originator itself or government ) for buying the receivables from the originator. 
The purpose of the agency is to isolate the receivables and the associated cash flows 
from the originator and perform certain other closely related operations ( e.g. 
restructuring of cash flows, credit enhancement, etc. ). Legal agreements on the 
securities state the rights and obligations of the investors，the originators and other 
participants in the operation. Credit rating agencies will assign a rating to the agency, 
taking into account the probability of credit problems and the legal structure of the 
proposed operation. The agency then issues the securities which are sold to investors. 
書 
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United States used mortgage securitization in the 1970's to promote residential 
mortgage finance. The success ofthe mortgage securitization encourage other forms of 
asset securitization in the 1980's. These securities are now a major instrument in the 
US capital market. In the 1990's, securitization begins to spread to other countries 
like United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and other European countries with similar 
legal and regulatory system as US. 
Secondary Mortgage Market 
A secondary mortgage market is one which existing mortgages are bought and 
sold. This is different from the familiar primary market where mortgages are 
originated. Mortgages are originated by initial lenders such as commercial banks. By 
definition, the owner of a mortgage that was purchased on the secondary market did 
not originate the loan. Agencies and firms that purchase mortgages on the secondary 
market most often raise the funds required for the purchase by issuing bonds or other 
types of debt instruments. They will pledge the mortgages ( now their assets ) as 
collateral for the debt they issue. The debt issue is termed a mortgage-backed security 
because it is backed up, or collateralised by mortgages. The interest and principal 
payments on the loan by the mortgagors provide the cash flow needed to pay interest 
to the holders ofMBS and to redeem the MBS when they mature. Mortgage-backed 




CASHFLOWS IN A SEVffLE MORTGAGE TRANSACTION 
Cashflows in a Simple Mortgage Transaction 
Buys Sells 
Mortgage MBS 
Mortgage • Secondary • Investor 
Originator Market 
Agency Pension Funds 
Mortgage Banker, Insurance Co, 
Thrifts ^ ^ etc. 
Cash Cash 
Effect on Balance Sheet 
Originator Agency Investor 
Mortgage(-) Mortgage(+) MBS(+) ^ ^ ^ ^ ! ' \ 
CAsh(+) Cash(-) 
Source : The Theory and Practice of Real Estate Finance，Clauretie and Webb 
Reasons for Mortgage Securitization 
In most developed countries, mortgage is still the dominant source of house 
financing. Mortgage is a pledge of a real estate to secure repayment of housing loan 
given by the lender to the buyer ofthe house. The pledge gives the lender the right to 
foreclose the loan and seize the property if the owner fails to repay the lender. With 
the Hong Kong's property market boom in 1990s, the mortgage market also 
undergone a rapid growth. The outstanding mortgage loan up to November 1996 was 
• 
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HK$ 319 billion. In fact, mortgage loan is the largest debt market in Hong Kong, far 
exceeding securities and corporate bond market. 
In Hong Kong residential mortgage loans are predominantly provided by the 
banking sector. As the demand rises, banks will need to rethink about their position 
towards this business. In the mortgage loan market, the banks are exposed to two 
major types ofrisks : liquidity risk and concentration risk. 
Liquidity risk refers to the risk that the asset cannot be easily and rapidly sold 
for cash at its current value. In the banking sector, financing long-term ( 10-15 years ) 
mortgages with short-term bank deposits runs a large maturity mismatch. Even though 
mortgages in Hong Kong have lower average life than comparable USAJK mortgages 
because of the much more active trading in property sector, there is little liquidity in 
mortgages at present. There are two main reasons for why mortgages are not liquid. 
First, mortgage assets are normally not homogeneous. This is especially true in Hong 
Kong where there are so many different types of properties and mortgages. The bank 
portfolio would consist of many different loans with different interest rates, dates of 
maturity, and loan-to-value ratios. Selling a massive loan with such different 
characteristics would be very difficult. Second, potential buyers are concerned with 
the default risk, particularly of conventional loans. International investors had little or 
no ability to judge the quality ofloans that were underwritten by a local bank. 
For the concentration risk, residential mortgages loans constituted around 
25.7% of total domestic loans. If loans to finance property development and 
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investment are included, property related loans as a whole took a very substantial share 
of44.8%.i These ratio may well increase along with the long-term rise in the demand 
for housing loans. Therefore, better ways must be found to enable the banking sector 
to diversify their business risk towards such high concentration on the property 
market. 
Mortgage securitization can release bank resources for other type of business 
and reduce the concentration risk exposure to the property sector. It can also reduce 
the liquidity risk arising from a maturity mismatch between long-term mortgage loans 
and short-term funds, such as deposits. Besides, it helps to release banking capital to 
meet the statutory capital adequacy requirement. The secondary mortgage market also 
enables authorised institutions with comparative advantage in originating or servicing 
loans to concentrate on those roles and transfer long term assets to long-term funding 
institutions, such as insurance and pension funds. 
There is a fundamental need to source long-term funds for financing home 
purchases. However, potential suppliers of long-term investors, such as pension fiinds 
and insurance companies, are not generally interested in investment in the primary 
mortgage market. The development of the "secondary mortgage market" could 
overcome this problem. The following section describes different types of MBS in 
detail. 
1 Data from HKMA Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Feb 1997 issue) 
Total loan and advances in Hong Kong : HK$ 1635B; loans for purchase ofresidentiaI properties : 
HK$ 420B; loans for building construction & property development: HK$ 313B. 
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Types ofMortgage Backed Securities 
There are several major types of mortgage backed securities : 
1. Mortgage pass-through securities 
2. Mortgage-backed bonds 
3. Mortgage pay-through bonds 
4. Collateralised mortgage obligations 
5. Stripped mortgage backed securities 
Mortgage Pass-Through Securities 
This is the first popular MBS. Pass-through securities are created when one or 
more holders of mortgages pools their mortgages together and sell undivided shares or 
participation certificates in the pool. With a pass-through security, the investor is said 
to have an undivided interest in the pool of mortgages. The investor has an 
"ownership" position in the mortgages. What this means is that he will receive the 
mortgage payments ( principal and interest) and any prepayments just as ifhe were the 
lender. The originator continues to service the mortgages including collection of 
payments and “pass through" principal and interest to the securities holders after 
deduction of servicing fees. The securities holders receive pro-rata shares of the 
resultant cash flows. 
They have relatively high yield, good liquidity and relatively risk-free quality. 
However, unpredictable prepayments of mortgages makes the timing of cash flows 
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unpredictable. Also, mortgages prepay more quickly when interest rates drop, so that 
the prepayments must be reinvested at lower market rates. Investors in pass-throughs 
face the same prepayment risk as mortgage lenders. For these reasons, other forms of 
mortgage backed securities have been developed to avoid the uncertainty surrounding 
the timing of cash flows. 
Mortgage-Backed Bonds 
Mortgage-backed bonds are similar to corporate bonds. They promise semi-
annual payments of interest only until maturity. The mortgages are owned by the bond 
issuer, so that investors have no ownership interest in the mortgages. They are issued 
primarily by private financial firms and usually backed by conventional residential and 
commercial mortgages. The maturity on the bonds will be less than that on the 
mortgages, and the yield will be slightly below that on the mortgages. Credit 
enhancement is accomplished through over-collateralisation. This means that the face 
value of the pool of mortgages will be greater than that of the bonds. Mortgage-
backed bonds give added security to the investor because of collateralisation, but do 
not add significant value to the issuer, except for better asset-liability management 
because of the longer maturity of the bonds and possibly lower interest costs. 
Mortgage Pay-Through Bonds 
Mortgage pay-through bonds are mortgage backed securities that are a cross 
between pass-throughs and mortgage-backed securities. As with mortgage-backed 
bonds, the issuer retains ownership of the pool of mortgages and issues the MPTB as a 
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debt obligation. The issuer will also over-collateralise the debt obligation. Just as with 
a pass-through, the cash flows to the investors are based on the coupon rate of 
interest, while principal from amortisation and prepayments is passed through as 
received from the pool of mortgages. Thus, the investors in these bonds faces the 
same prepayment risk as those in pass-throughs. Mortgage pay-through bonds are also 
rated by the agencies based on the same factors associated with mortgage-backed 
bonds. Because the scheduled amortisation of the mortgages and prepayments is 
passed through to reduce the principal of the bonds, the extent of over-collateralisation 
is less than that with mortgage-backed bonds. 
Collateralised Mortgage Obligations ( CMOs ) 
Much of the innovations in the MBS market has involved efforts to manage and 
to price the prepayment risk. A major innovation in mortgage securitization was the 
development of Collateralised Mortgage Obligations ( CMO ). CMO go the farthest 
in rearranging the uncertain cash flows from a pool of mortgages into those desired by 
investors. The restructuring of the cash flows is the most complicated of all MBS. 
The objective of CMOs is to rearrange the mortgage cash flows into several different 
bond-like securities with different maturities to meet the needs of a broad group of 
investors. 
CMO was first introduced in 1983 and gave investors an improved capacity to 
deal with the prepayment risk of pass-through securities. Investors are grouped into a 
number of classes with different maturities and receive payments in a predetermined 
order. The key difference between traditional pass-throughs and CMO is the principal 
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payment process. Unlike pass-through securities, principal payments in CMO are 
made on a sequential basis with all the principal going to the shortest maturity tranche 
first until it is retired. After the shortest maturity bonds are retired, all principal 
payments received will apply to the next tranche in the schedule. This pattern will be 
repeated until the final CMO tranche is reached. For instance, in a CMO with four 
"sequential paying" tranches ( A，B, C and Z ), all payments of principal ( including 
prepayment ) are initially directed to the A tranche and successively to the B and C 
tranches. The Z tranche receives no payment until all earlier tranches are fully repaid. 
Because the cash flows from the mortgage pool are uncertain, there will be a tranche 
into which all residual cash flows accrue. This residual tranche will often be "owned" 
by the issuer ofthe CMO. Thus, the issuer will have to have an equity interest in the 
CMO. 
The CMO structure enables the investment community to restructure cash 
flows in intricate ways so as to match the maturity, liquidity and risk preferences of the 
investors. The A tranche would often have an expected average life of one to three 
years while the Z tranche would have an expected average life of fifteen to twenty 
years. The varying repayment profiles allows a variety of investors to choose a 
maturity position among the tranches. Since CMO redirects cash flows from a pass-
through to different bond classes, it redistributes the prepayment risk so as to offer a 
greater degree of protection against call and reinvestment risk to the longer CMO 
tranches. Besides, other transformation of cash flows can be made, such as converting 
monthly receipts into quarterly payments. 
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Besides sequential pay CMO，other forms of financial innovations have been 
derived. The derivative products include accmal bonds, floating rate and inverse 
floating rate bonds, planned amortisation class ( PAC ) bonds, targeted amortisation 
class ( TAC ) bonds and CMO residuals. These innovations enable the securities to 
have : 
(1) a better cash flow stability of over a wider range of pre-payment speeds; 
(2) a better matching of floating rate liabilities; 
(3) a substantial upside potential in a declining interest rate environment, but a less 
down-side risk in a rising interest rate environment; 
(4) a greater usefialness for hedging mortgage backed products. 
With better credit quality, CMOs usually get triple-A ratings by the major 
commercial rating agencies and are welcomed by most investors. 
Stripped Mortgage-backed Securities ( SMBS ) 
Stripped mortgage-backed securities ( SMBS ) divides the principal and 
interest generated from the underlying pool of mortgage from a pro-rata basis to an 
unequal basis. The resulting securities have a price / yield relationship different from 
the underlying mortgage pool. There are 3 major types of stripped mortgage backed 
securities : 
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Synthetic Coupon Pass-throughs 
In a synthetic coupon pass-through, there is an unequal distribution of coupon 
and principal as a result of a synthetic coupon rate different from the underlying 
collateral. 
Interest Only / Principal Only Strips 
This is a security where all the interest is allocated to one class ( the interest 
class ) while all the principal to the other class (the principal class ). The interest class 
receives no principal payment and the principal class receives no interests. The yields 
ofthe two securities are varies asymmetrically with different prepayment rates. For the 
principal only security, a higher prepayment will increase the yield of the securities. In 
contrast, the yield of interest class will decrease with higher prepayment. The reason is 
that as pre-payments are made, the outstanding principal will decline and less dollar 
interest will be received, 
CMO Strips 
CMO Strips are tranches within a CMO issue which receive only principal or 
interest cash flows or having synthetically high coupon rates. 
In general, SMBS is highly sensitive to changes in prevailing interest and pre-
payment rates and have asymmetrical returns. Investors can take market positions 
depending on expected movements in prepayment or interest rates. Principal only 
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SMBS is a bullish instrument which out-performs other instruments in a declining 
interest rate environment, while interest-only SMBS is a bearish instrument that can be 
used to hedge against rising interest rates. Other than acting as a hedging tool, SMBS 
can combine with other fixed-income securities to enhance the total portfolio return in 
varying interest rate scenarios and tailor-make the investment portfolio to meet the 
duration ofliabilities and minimise the interest rate risk. 
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CHAPTERII 
MBS MARKET EXPEMENCE EV OTHER COUNTMES^ 
United States 
United States has a highly developed money and capital market. Mortgage 
backed securities was one of the financial innovations originated in the US market. 
The MBS market in the United States is still the largest in the world. The total amount 
of mortgage debt outstanding in 1996 amount to US$ 4,860 Billion, of which US$ 
1,710 Billion have been securitised ( Tables 1 - 5 ). Thus, a thorough understanding of 
the development history of United States MBS market can provide usefiil insights to 
the development of a similar market in Hong Kong. 
2 The historical information on the MBS development in US，UK and Australia in this chapter was 
mainly adopted from the book, "Securitization : An International Perspective" by John Thompson. 
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TABLE 1 
MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDEs[G JN US 
1991 - 1996* (US$ Millions) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* 
Total Outstanding~~3,962,607~~4,091,827~~4,266,657 4,472,693~~4,715,884 4,859,561 
By Type of 
Mortgage 
1 - 4 Family 2,849,780 3,036,251 3,225,371 3,429,616 4,706,654 3,749,867 
Multifamily 284,412 274,234 270,796 275,304 287,935 296,888 
Commercial 749,114 700,604 689,296 684,803 707,328 726,308 
Farm 79,305 80,738 81,194 82,971 84,620 86,498 
By Holder 
CommercialBanks 876,100 894,513 940,444 1,004,280 1,080,373 1,099,554 
Savings 705,367 627,972 598,330 596,199 596,789 606,163 
Institutions 
Life Insurance Cos 265,258 246,702 229,061 215,332 211,815 210,499 
Federal / Agency 266,146 286,263 327,014 319,327 313,760 314,694 
MortgagePools/ 1,258,155 1,433,183 1,562,925 1,717,991 1,853,632 1,946,036 
Trusts 
Individuals/Others 591,580 603,194 608,884 619,565 650,286 682,615 
Source : PSA The BondMarket Trader Association 
* Second Quarter Preliminary 
16 
TABLE 1 
ISSUANCE OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITEES JN US (PASS-THROUGHS) 
1980-1996(US$ Billions) 
GNMA FNMA FHLMC Total 
T^ l06 - 2^ 23J 
1981 14.3 0.7 3.5 18.5 
1982 16.0 14.0 24.2 54.2 
1983 50.7 13.3 21.4 85.4 
1984 28.1 13.5 20.5 62.1 
1985 46.0 23.6 41.5 111.1 
1986 101.4 60.6 102.4 264.4 
1987 94.9 63.2 75.0 233.1 
1988 55.2 54.9 39.8 149.9 
1989 57.1 69.8 73.5 200.4 
1990 64.4 96.7 73.8 234.9 
1991 62.6 112.9 92.5 268.0 
1992 81.9 194.0 179.2 455.2 
1993 139.0 221.4 208.7 568.1 
1994 111.2 130.6 117.1 359.0 
1995 72.9 110.5 85.9 269.2 
1996 100.9 149.9 119.7 370.5 
Source : PSA The BondMarket Trader Association 
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TABLE 1 
OUTSTANDESfG VOLUME OF AGENCY MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITffiS 
mvs 
~ 1980-1996(US$ Billions) 
GNMA FNMA FHLMC Total 
m o ^ - n 110.9 
1981 105.8 0.7 19.9. 126.4 
1982 118.9 14.4 43.0 176.3 
1983 159.8 25.1 59.4 244.3 
1984 180.0 36.2 73.2 289.4 
1985 212.1 55.0 105.0 372.1 
1986 262.7 97.2 174.5 534.4 
1987 315.8 140.0 216.3 672.1 
1988 340.5 178.3 231.1 749.9 
1989 369.9 228.2 278.2 876.3 
1990 403.6 299.8 321.0 1,024.4 
1991 425.3 372.0 363.2 1,160.5 
1992 419.3 445.2 409.2 1,273.5 
1993 414.0 495.5 440.1 1,349.6 
1994 450.9 530.3 460.7 1,441.9 
1995 472.3 583.0 515.1 1,570.4 
1996 505.0 (e) 650.7 554.3 1,710.0 
Source : PSA The Bond Market Trader Association 
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TABLE 1 
ISSUANCE OF AGENCY CMOS JN US 
1987 - 1996 ( US$ Billions) 
GNMA FNMA FHLMC Total 
T^ - ^9 “ 0^ 
1988 - 11.2 13.0 24.2 
1989 - 37.6 39.8 77.3 
1990 - 60.9 40.5 101.4 
1991 - 101.8 72.0 173.8 
1992 - 154.8 131.3 286.1 
1993 - 168.0 143.3 311.3 
1994 3.1 56.3 73.1 132.6 
1995 1.9 8.2 15.4 25.4 
1996 9.5 (e) 26.7(e) 34.1 70.3 
Source : PSA The BondMarket Trader Association 
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TABLE 1 
OUTSTANDmG VOLUME OF AGENCY CMOS W US 
1987 - 1996:Q3 ( US$ Billions) 
FNMA FHLMC Total 
1987 0.9 n.a. 0.9 
1988 11.6 10.9 22.5 
1989 47.6 47.6 95.2 
1990 104.3 83.4 187.7 
1991 193.3 143.0 336.3 
1992 276.9 217.0 494.0 
1993 323.4 264.1 587.5 
1994 315.0 263.7 578.7 
1995 294.0 247.0 541.0 
1996 274.8 235.4 510.2 
Source : PSA The Bond Market Trader Association 
20 
Rise of Securitization in US Market 
Securitization has emerged as a distinctive feature of the financial system in the 
United States over the past two decades. Several factors have encouraged the growth 
of securitization. The historical separation between banking system and capital market 
created two channels for financial intermediation. The US system can be contrasted 
with other countries which the banks dominate most aspects of financial 
intermediation, even when financial innovations were introduced. Different classes of 
US financial institutions ( banks, thrift institutions, securities houses, institutional 
investors ) compete among themselves in devising innovative financial products. The 
process ofbank disintermediation ( i.e. replacement of on-balance sheet financing by 
depository institutions with off-balance-sheet financing in securities market ), has 
probably progressed further in the United States than in any other country. This 
phenomenon is particularly obvious in mortgage finance. Over the past decades, on-
balance sheet housing financing by banks has been losing importance relative to the 
capital market. This can be clearly seen in Table 2 and 3 which show the historical 
trends of residential mortgage finance in the United States. As the banking industry 
contracted, the emergency of strong demand from institutional investors provided an 
important alternative channel for housing finance. 
Many trends in the banking industries encouraged mortgage securitization. 
The tradition of fixed-rate mortgages and the resulting risk of large asset / liability 
mismatches encouraged banks to use securitization. The incentive to securitise became 
particularly powerfiil when interest-rate volatility increased after 1970. With growing 
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emphasis in the banking industry on the efficient use of capital and the control ofrisk, 
many US banks are seeking to de-emphasise lending as a source of revenue and instead 
wish to focus on services that generate fee income. Similarly, depository institutions 
can generate increased earnings from any given level of capital through securitization 
and mortgage sales is obviously a cost-efficient way of achieving this objective. 
A marked institutionalisation ofwealth has been occurring in the Untied States, 
with fimds accumulating in the hands of institutional investors such as mutual funds, 
insurance companies and pension fiinds. This large and diverse community of 
institutional investors has a rising demand for securities with different liquidity, risk 
and maturity characteristics. In response to this growing demand by investors for 
assets with attractive risk / return characteristics, investment banks have sought to 
create instruments specifically tailored to the requirements of particular investors. This 
has encouraged intermediaries to structure securities with risk tranches differentiate by 
credit risk, liquidity and maturity that closely match investor preferences. 
Furthermore, since US institutional investors are accustomed to doing intensive risk 
analysis，they have not been intimidated by the complexity of some of the structures 
involved. 
Support from and innovations of Federal agencies were important in the early 
development of the market for MBS. With the large number of geographically 
dispersed banks, official support eased flows of resources among regions and reduced 
geographic risk concentrations at financial institutions. With a large number of 
originating institutions and disparate systems of documentation at the outset, the 
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mortgage securitization process itself encouraged standardisation in underwriting of 
systems to monitor payments. Standardisation occurred not because the official 
regulators imposed such conditions. Originators sought to make mortgages conform 
to standards set by securitization agencies in order to improve liquidity. The extension 
of direct and indirect Federal support ( to the securities issued by the agencies ) 
reduced uncertainties while agencies were developing a range of benchmark securities 
and while the market was developing pricing models for such securities. 
MBS Market Development in United States 
The largest category of securitization-related assets consisted of mortgage-
backed securities. In US the great majority of mortgage-backed securities are issued 
and guaranteed by a government-sponsored agencies. The outstanding volume of 
these securities exceeds US$1.71 trillion, making this the second largest category of 
bonds in the United States after the Treasury Bonds. These securities fall into the 
broad category of "government agency papers" - a category of assets fairly close to 
Treasury securities in terms of credit risk, but with somewhat higher yields. 
Mortgages securitised by any of these agencies must meet strict credit quality 
standards and cannot exceed specified amounts. The mortgages are assembled into a 
"pool" which produces an identifiable cash flow as the backing for marketable "pass 
through" securities having various maturities and coupon rates. Usually, the 
originating institution continues as "servicer" of the underlying loans. More than half 
of the residential mortgages in the United States are securitised. 
23 
The process ofmortgage securitization began in 1970's when the Government 
National Mortgage Association ( GNMA or "Ginnie Mae" ), the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation ( FHLMC or "Freddie Mac" ), agencies of the Federal 
Government, commenced programmes to securitise residential mortgages originated by 
banks, thrifts or mortgage companies. A third federal agency, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association ( FNMA or "Fannie Mae" ) also began securitising mortgages in 
the 1980's. In the cases of banks and thrifts, institutions which hold mortgages on 
balance sheet, the securitised assets are removed from the balance sheet. Federal 
agencies also securitise mortgages originated by mortgage companies, institutions 
which engage exclusively in off-balance sheet securitization, and which now account 
for a considerable share of the total mortgage market. The legal status and the 
operating techniques of the three main Federal agencies involved in housing finance are 
somewhat different. 
The GNMA was set up in 1968 and is an agency within the Federal 
Government. The agency securitises only mortgages insured by the Federal Housing 
Administration or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration. Focus is placed on the 
housing programs for low income groups. It does not buy loans directly but swaps 
securities for loans from the originator, and guarantees the resulting pass-through 
security for an annual fee of 6 basis-points. GNMA received legislative authorisation 
to issue its own CMOs in 1994. Credit enhancement on the pass-throughs come from 
two sources. First, the underlying loans are guaranteed against default by the FHA and 
the VA. Second, GNMA guarantees the timely payment of interest and principal. 
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The other two agencies, FNMA and FHLMC, which have only indirect ties to 
the Federal Government, purchase loans for their portfolio directly from lenders. Both 
agencies supports the secondary mortgage market by issuing MBS and purchasing 
mortgages. Credit enhancement comes from its ability to borrow from the US 
Treasury, and its equity results from the sale of stock and direct corporate bonds. 
FHLMC funds itselfpartly with direct corporate bonds and also partly by issuing pass-
though securities. In addition to purchasing loans, both agencies swap MBS for loans. 
The swapping lender funds the loans by selling the MBS and pays the agencies a 
guarantee fee of 20 - 25 basis points. FNMA and FHLMC used to purchase or 
securitise primarily "conventional" loans, i.e. loans without Federal Housing 
Administration insurance or Veterans Administration guarantees. Nowadays, both 
have broaden their business to purchase FHA and VA loans. 
Besides the three Federal Government agencies, other private corporations can 
also issue non-agency mortgage backed securities. The first non-agency MBS was 
introduced by Bank of America in 1977. The originators ofthese “private label MBS" 
include banks, thrifts and home builders. With MBS being issued without strong 
Federal support, the problem of analysis and management of credit risk became more 
serious. It must be noted that the purchase of a MBS has very limited recourse to the 
mortgage originator and hence it is important to ensure that 
(i) the receivables are sufficient to generate the payment stipulated in the security 
(ii) safe-guards are provided in case of short-fall in revenues 
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(iii) the investor has a sufficiently clear legal claim on income from the receivables, 
with adequate protection in the case of delinquency. 
In order to assess and reduce the credit risk, two major techniques were 
developed that have now been used not only in the US market, but the entire 
international MBS market. The two techniques are (1) the use of credit enhancement 
and (2) the enhancement role of rating agencies. 
With credit risk a serious consideration in all MBS that do not carry Federal 
Government support, the rating agencies must examine each deal in detail to determine 
whether the mortgage and the MBS structure are adequate to justify a particular credit 
rating. It is now generally expected that all MBS will carry ratings from at least two 
rating agencies prior to issue. 
Regarding credit enhancement ofMBS, some ofthe popular choices include : 
(1) Third party enhancement 
An external party, usually an insurance company or a bank, provides a 
guarantee. A number of specialised companies, called “monoline insurers" 
have emerged as a result. The function of these companies is to offer credit 




An alternative means of obtaining credit enhancement is to create a "senior / 
subordinated" structure, in which that senior tranche creditors have a priority 
claim ofthe pass-through payments over subordinated tranche creditors. 
(3) Overcollateralisation 
The value of the mortgage pool is greater than is needed to support the 
contractual payments, so that the investor is protected in the event of a 
potential shortfall in expected payments. The excess collateral is usually held in 
a subordinated tranche or a special account. 
(4) Cash collateral account 
A cash deposit can be held in a special account which allows for payments in 
case of a shortfall of payment from the receivables A slight variation is a 
"spread account" which represents the difference between the margin received 
by the originator and that of the investor. The MBS originator will receive 
payment from the spread account only of other creditors are paid in full 
Over the long-term development of the MBS market, changes in the relative 
importance of the various forms of credit enhancement is observed. In general, with 
the down-grading of many US banks and insurance companies, third party guarantees 
have declined in importance, even though the "monoline" insurers have all retained 
their credit ratings and remain a significant force in the market. Overall, senior / 
subordinated structure over-collateralisation or reserve funds are becoming the most 
widely used forms of credit enhancement. 
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Besides, Federal Government requires these non-agency MBS to be registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mortgage pass-through securities are 
quoted and traded in the same way as Treasury securities. The large secondary market 
for MBS are the New York Stock Exchange and the American Exchange. The 
availability of an active secondary market enables the establishment o f a mature MBS 
market in the US. 
Key Success Factors for MBS Development in US 
In summary, several factors have encouraged the growth of mortgage 
securitization in the United States : 
(1) Support from Federal Government to the early development ofMBS 
(2) Large number of geographically dispersed banks give rise to a need for 
mechanisms to ease flows of resources among regions and reduce geographical 
risk concentration. 
(3) The tradition of fixed-rate mortgages and the resulting risk of large asset / 
liability mismatches favoured securitization. 
(4) The separation between the banking and securities giving rise to alternative 
channels for financial intermediation 
(5) The decline of savings & loan sector and the rise share of capital market in 
intermediation 
(6) The presence of a sophisticated community of institutional investors 
(7) The diminishing availability oflow-cost deposits for mortgage funding 
(8) The strain on the banks to improve capital / asset ratio in the 1980s 
28 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom represents the largest market in securitised assets outside 
the United States, with MBS accounting for 80% of all securitised assets. However, 
MBS issuance reached its peak in 1988, and the peak of outstanding occurred in 1989. 
The pace of issuance accelerated in 1993 from 1992,s very low levels, but still 
remained well below the volumes of 1988 - 1991 ( See Table 6 ). Thus, securitization 
remains of only margin significance for the financial system as a whole, with neither 
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MBS or ABS sector showing great dynamism in the past few years. Even though the 
British legal and regulatory infrastructure does not present any obvious barrier to the 
expansion of securitization, the major explanation of the low level of activity is weak 
demand on the part ofmarket participants. There has been no programme comparable 
to that in the United States to provide official guarantees for mortgages. The main 
potential originators ( banks and building societies ) have adequate capital. Moreover, 
as a result of sluggish real economic activity in the past few years, loan growth has 
been slack and the slump in the property market has made MBS issuance more 
difficult. Nevertheless, in expectation of some pickup in activity and a change in 
funding conditions, financial intermediaries continue to undertake a moderate amount 
of securitization ~ including some innovative operations — in order to be able to use 
the technique more widely if the situation changes. 
29 
TABLE 1 
ISSUANCE OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITffiS ES" UNITED KINGDOM 
1985 - 1994 (£Billions) 
Residential Residential Commercial Total 
Mortgages Mortgages Mortgages 
( f i r s t ) (second) 
m 5 S - - ^ 
1986 - - - -
1987 1,000 - - 1,000 
1988 3,301 - - 3,301 
1989 2,427 - - 2,427 
1990 2,246 - - 2,246 
1991 2,759 - - 2,759 
1992 298 170 -
1993 913 92 135 1,140 
1994 2,563 - 333 2,896 
Source : “Securitization: An international perspective ”, John K Thompson, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
MBS Market Development in UK 
The British residential mortgage market is huge, with an estimated £ 411 
Billion outstanding in January 1997. It was an explicit policy of the government in the 
1980s to encourage widespread home ownership. Although the authorities have never 
undertaken an official programme to guarantee mortgages as in the United States, 
there has been a trend since the 1960s for owner-occupied housing to account for a 
rising share of the housing stock. The main traditional providers of mortgage finance 
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have been the building societies ( mutual savings banks ), which engage in on-balance-
sheet lending and depend mainly on retail deposits ( historically, a low-cost source of 
funding ). The building societies supplied nearly all housing finance in the regulated 
environment that prevailed though the late 1970s. With restrictions in bank credit 
expansion, the building societies faced excess demand for mortgages and set both 
deposit and lending rates on the basis of a cartel-like arrangement. Building societies 
which have mutual status have been keen to acquire mortgage books, but have 
remained reluctant to sell mortgage securities to third parties. Because of the relative 
health of the sector, there was no need to securitise mortgage loans. 
In the mid-1980s, the British mortgage and property markets boomed, resulting 
in a rapid increase in the volume of outstanding mortgage credit. The financial market 
was deregulated. Banks were freed from credit restrictions and building societies 
were allowed to compete with banks in offering a number of financial services. By 
1982, banks were doing some 36% of all new residential mortgage lending. At first, 
there was some net decline in savings deposit in the building societies, forcing them to 
borrow on a large scale in the money and capital markets. Nevertheless, as interest 
rate rose in the later 1980s, retail savings reflowed into the building societies. The 
building societies were able to borrow on favorable terms in the money and capital 
markets. At the same time, the building societies face regulatory ceiling which limit 
wholesale funding to 40% of liabilities. Although the commercial banks gained in 
market share in the 1980s, the building societies still accounted for almost two-thirds 
of total mortgage lending in 1993. In addition to these institutions which engaged in 
on-balance sheet mortgage lending, in 1985 - 86 special mortgage lenders ( SMLs ) 
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were formed; these rely primarily on off-balance sheet securitization as a funding 
technique. By 1994，the SMLs accounted for some 6% of mortgage lending. 
Mortgages in UK normally have maturities of about 25 years at variable rates. 
Rates are usually reset at 6-month intervals. The lender is not obliged to align the 
lending rate with market rates, but tends to do so, since the borrower has the 
prepayment option with only a small fee. Recently, there has been a trend toward 
mortgages that are fixed for relatively long periods. Many mortgages have recently 
had rates fixed for as long as 10 years, but fixed rate mortgages of up to 25 years are 
available. Although more than half of the new mortgages in 1993 were at fixed rates, 
the figure for outstanding mortgages was less than 10%. In the past, most mortgages 
were annuity mortgages in which principal and interest are repaid over the life of the 
loan, with the share of principal rising over t i m e � A t 1994，only about one-fifth of 
mortgages are in annuity form. The endowment mortgages now accounts for about 
four-fifths of the total. Under this system, the borrower takes out an endowment 
insurance policy at the beginning of the loan, which is assigned to the mortgagee who 
receives the principal at maturity of the policy or upon the death of the borrower. 
As mentioned above, the SMLs specialise in mortgage origination and 
servicing, with mortgage securitization as funding technique. In an effort to introduce 
securitization technique developed in the United States, three non-bank-affiliated 
SMLS were formed, one of which was a subsidiary of Salomon Brothers; several 
SMLs were also established as subsidiaries of British of foreign banks. Mortgage 
loans are sold to a special purpose vehicle which issues securities, most commonly 
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sterling floating rate notes ( FRNs ). Coupons are typically set quarterly at a stipulated 
spread over LffiOR. As in other MBS markets, interest and principal ( including 
prepayments ) are passed through to investors. Some innovative MBS issues have 
been made in the United Kingdom. Similarly, some securities with multiple-tranche 
sequential pay have been issued, emulating some of the cash flow restructuring that are 
used in the MBS market in the United States. By the end ofMarch 1992，total issues 
by SMLs amounted to £ 11.2 Billion, which represented more than 90% of total MBS 
issues and 3% of total mortgages outstanding. 
Credit Enhancement and Credit Rating 
In keeping with standard MBS market practice, these securities are given credit 
enhancement and are rated by rating agencies. Initially, credit enhancement took the 
form of guarantee from insurance companies or bank letters ofcredit. However, as the 
rating of banks and insurance companies have been lowered, this method left the 
securities vulnerable to downgrading as well. Consequently，while two-thirds of all 
MBS were still enhanced by insurance companies at the end of 1993, other techniques, 
especially subordination, were increasingly used for enhancement. Thus far, nearly all 
MBS have been rated AAA or AA. 
Legal and Regulatory Framework 
The legal and regulatory framework in the United Kingdom does not present a 
significant barrier to the expansion of securitization. The authorities did not make 
explicit policies to facilitate the advance of securitization, but have generally made 
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rules enabling the practice to proceed where market demand proved strong enough to 
support an expansion. 
The Securities and Investment Board, which is responsible for the regulation of 
investment business, has been willing to approve ABS and MBS offerings. The 
regulation ofbanks is undertaken by the Bank ofEngland, while the Building Societies 
Commission assumes a similar role for the building societies. In 1989，the Department 
ofthe Environment issued voluntary guidelines aimed at protecting borrowers in cases 
the loan is transferred, since that time borrower protection measures have not been an 
obstacle to securitization. Both the Bank of England and the Building Society 
Commission have been willing to accord off-balance sheet treatment to MBS, but have 
required that all risk inherent in underlying assets be removed in order to obtain ofF-
balance sheet treatment. The greatest uncertainty concerning regulatory questions in 
the recent past has involved the risk weighting assigned to MBS. For a time in 1991 -
92，the authorities ruled that, in line with the capital adequacy guidelines of the 
Commission of the European Communities, MBS carried on-balance-sheets by banks 
and building societies would command a 100% capital charge rather than the previous 
required 50%. Subsequently, however, the 50% risk weighting was restored. 
Currently, the Commission allows the application of a 50% weighting to all 
commercial and residential mortgage credit or mortgage backed securities. 
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Future Development 
Although the MBS market in the United Kingdom is the largest market in 
securitised assets outside the United States, it has not expanded as rapidly as predicted 
by some observers in the late 1980s. Following a sharp rise in new issues that 
accompanied the established of SMLs in 1985 - 86, outstandings reached a peak of 
about £3.5 Billion in 1988 and have leveled off in subsequent years. The lack of 
fiirther expansion can be attributed mostly to lack of demand, on the part of both 
issuers and investors. From the issuer side, the great majority of MBS issues were 
made by SMLs. Banks and building societies only used mortgage securitization to a 
very limited degree. Until now, the banks and the building societies have no strong 
incentive to securitise since they are adequately capitalised and usually had access to 
cheap sources of funding. Consequently, only about 3% of total mortgages in the 
United Kingdom were securitised. Concerning investors, nearly half of UK-originated 
MBS are purchased by banks and, to a lesser degree, building societies. A number 
have also been acquired by foreign banks. Many pension funds are seeking longer-
term fixed-rate assets to match their pension liabilities, and do not prefer floating rate 
instruments. Likewise, purchases by insurance companies have been modest. 
The down-turn in the UK housing market significantly affect the MBS market. 
The decline in the value ofthe collateral has required further credit enhancement, make 
securitization increasing expensive. The downgrading of banks and insurance 
companies triggered downgrading of MBS which they had offered third-party 
guarantees. Thus, whereas 93% of ABS and MBS issued by UK residents were 
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originally rated AAA, by February 1994 some 46% of issues were rated AA. There 
were also some special problems in the SML sector. The competitive lending rates on 
building societies and bank mortgage operations ( due to cheap retail funding ) meant 
that SMLs tended to operate at the risky fringe of the market on high loan-to-value 
ratios. Consequently, the fall in house prices and the rise in unemployment hit the 
SMLs disproportionately. Having withdrawn from the market for two to three years, 
some SMLs have recently resumed originations. Some MBS were issued with AA 
rather than AAA rating. Another factor discouraging activity is that a major SML has 
experienced well-publicised financial difficulties with led to higher risk premiums on 
MBS, while the other SMLS have also fallen on hard times due to the contraction in 
business. Taken together, these developments have led some market participants to 
look upon MBS market as risk-prone. Many institutions would no longer purchase 
subordinated tranches. All of these factors have increased the cost of securitization, 
which had never attained a clear cost advantage over more traditional funding 
techniques. A number ofinstitutions which had been active in the market in the mid to 
late 1980s have now withdrawn. 
The development of the MBS market in the United Kingdom was hindered by 
the decline in residential market since early 1990's. The decline in the property market 
has harmed the MBS market in several ways. The rate of mortgage origination has 
declined considerably. As shown in Table 7, net mortgage originations declined since 
1990. The low turn-over in the housing market limited the issuance ofMBS. Some 
agencies have responded to this pressure by purchasing SMLs which has previously 
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been active MBS issuers, thus expanding both their mortgage portfolio and distribution 
capacity. 
TABLE 7 
UNITED KINGDOM NET MORTGAGE ADVANCES AND RESK)ENTIAL 
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: 1988-1995 
Net Advances Transactions 
(£) 
m S £23 ,677M 1,990,000 
1989 £ 24,041 M 1,467,000 
1990 £ 24,090 M 1,283,000 
1991 £ 20,585 M 1,225,000 
1992 £ 13,448 M 1,032,000 
1993 £ 9,425 M 1,114,000 
1994 £11，083 M 1,168,000 
1995 £ 8,296 M -
Source : Mortgage Banking (May 1996) 
The recent increase in the amount of fixed-rate mortgages may stimulate 
originators incentive to use securitization in order to avoid maturity mismatches. 
Moreover, the building societies face regulatory limits on the use of wholesale funding. 
In recent times, retail deposits have became a relatively expensive means of financing 
comparing to both wholesale fonding and securitization. Yet, the overall economic 
down turn seems to the dominant market factor and we have only limited MBS issue 
in 1996. Substantial growth of the UK MBS market is likely to be limited until further 
increase in loan origination upon improvement of the general economic condition 
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Australia 
MBS Market Development in Australia 
The Australian MBS market has been encouraged by government's official 
programmes to support housing. Unlike the United States where central government 
has been active in promoting the market, the state government took the lead in 
, Australia MBS market. Due to constraints on state government borrowing in the 
1980s, it became increasingly difficult for states to sustain public funding of low-cost 
housing. However, Australian government made it possible for low income 
households to obtain housing finance from certain intermediaries，which were financed 
through a securitization programme. A moderately large amount of residential 
mortgage securitization was seen in Australia. Close to A$3 Billion of MBS was 
issued in 1995. Add this to the outstanding A$7 Billion that had been issued up to 
1994, and the Australian market appears quite developed. 
The securitization programme began in Australia in 1985, with the issue of 
promissory notes by the National Mortgage Market Corporation ( NMMC ), 
established in 1984 by the Victorian government. In late 1986 the First Australian 
National Mortgage Acceptance Corporation ( FANMAC ) was formed by the state 
government of New South Wales. It was the first to issue investment grade, term 
securities. Each of these organisations has state government as part owners, in 
conjunction with private sector shareholders. By June 1994, 12 organisations were 
involved in mortgage securitization programmes ( generally through trust structures ). 
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In 1995, the two government-related issuers, FANMAC and NMMC, accounted for 
32% and 34%, respectively, of outstanding MBS. These issuers obtain pools of 
mortgages originated by financial institutions under government housing schemes. 
Originating institutions often retain no liability for defaults, and credit and liquidity 
support is provided by the governments involved. 
Securitization has only had a marginal impact on the market for mortgage 
finance. In 1994, there are A$ 135 Billion of residential mortgages outstanding 
through intermediaries but only A$6 Billion were in securitised form. The main 
institutions in the primary mortgage market are the commercial banks, which tend to 
keep mortgages on their balance sheet. Until recently, involvement by financial 
institutions as originators ofMBS has been limited to a few building societies, credit 
unions and co-operative housing societies. Most mortgages in Australia are variable 
rate and have maturities of 20 - 30 years. The interest rate can be changed periodically 
at the discretion ofthe lending institution as market rates changes.. However, in recent 
years a small market has developed in housing loans with rates capped or fixed for an 
initial period ( sometimes up to 10 years ). Typically, fixed rate mortgage prepayment 
carries an interest penalty，generally of one month's interest for each year of the fixed-
term remaining. The loans underlying FANMAC and NMMC programmes typically 
have carried interest rates fixed for long periods or indexed to the rate of inflation, and 
in the past have had no prepayment penalty. 
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Credit Enhancement 
Since there is no direct central government programme to guarantee 
mortgages, credit risk can be a significant consideration ( although, as noted above, 
some schemes have state government support ). Credit enhancement have taken the 
form of insurance of individual mortgages，pools insurance, lines of credit, over-
collateralisation, and senior / subordinated bond structures. Most early Australian 
programs - including FANMAC, Keystart Bonds, Victorial Housing Bonds and SAFE 
-protect MBS investors against credit losses by using state government support or 
another guarantee to establish unlimited amount of credit support. However, recent 
transactions have had limits on credit enhancement, with subordinated bonds providing 
the credit support. In general, the credit rating of Australian MBS is high with around 
half-rated AAA, and all at least investment grade. 
The spreads of MBS over benchmarks vary significantly. MBS trade at a 
spread over government bonds of similar maturity. Quoted yields on 3-year MBS in 
1994 ranged from 65 to 90 or more basis points over Commonwealth Government 
Securities ( CGS ). The premiums in these spreads reflect credit risk, prepayment risk, 
and lesser liquidity. Market participants reported that trading in MBS is rather 
subdued. ( As a comparison, spreads on 3-year New South Wales Treasury 
Corporation Bonds over CGS were around 20 basis points.) 
Initially, FANMAC's issues were single tranche pass-through securities, but 
more recently several issues have used a multi-tranche approach using collateralised 
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mortgage obligation techniques. Floating rate coupons pass-through securities, 
straight mortgage bonds with bullet payments, inflation-indexed bond and short term 
commercial paper instruments have also been used by various issuers. Most MBS 
issues have used a trust structure. Recently, NMMC launched a substantial 
programme of variable rate bonds. 
Legal and Regulatory Framework 
The expansion ofthe Australian MBS market was aided by important legal and 
regulatory changes. State stamp taxes were lifted and restraints that would have 
prevented state-based building societies and credit unions from selling assets were 
removed. The Australian Government's Housing Loan Insurance Corporation ( HLIC 
)were permitted to insure pools of mortgages, rather than individual mortgages. 
Regulations covering certain categories of institutional investors were modified to 
permit investments in MBS. The establishment ofrating agencies and the alignment of 
Australian ratings with those in other markets have made it easier to market securities 
with complex structures. 
There are no explicit legal obstacles to the further growth of the market. 
However, changes in 1992 to the Corporation Law have made access to the non-
professional market difficult. Securitised programmes intended for the non-
professional market have to comply with onerous reporting provisions under sections 
of the law which cover debentures and prescribed interests ( e.g. trusts ). 
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Future Development 
Despite the recent strong growth in MBS volume, prospects for fiirther 
expansion ofthe MBS market are mixed. Concerns remain about the effect ofintense 
competition in residential mortgage lending on the credit quality of mortgage collateral 
in new securitisations. Industry observers expect the increased volumes of lending 
experienced by mortgage managers in 1995 to continue, despite a recent slowdown in 
new housing activities. 
As competition among lenders intensifies，loan quality may start to deteriorate, 
because lenders will fight to maintain their market share and profit margins. There 
already are signs of loosening credit standards for home loan approvals, and some 
lenders are originating mortgages with increasingly high loan-to-value ratio. 
Other emerging credit issues also warrant close scrutiny by investors as new 
issuers enter the market. Such issues include the impact of equitable assignments to 
the security package of the structure; rights of set-off that exist in the insolvency of a 
deposit-taking institution that sells the mortgage loans; and certain cash flow payment 
mismatches. 
Until recently, the major Australian banks have not been active in the 
securitization market. From the side of banks, incentives to securitise are small. The 
practice of granting variable-rate mortgages has prevented the emergency of large 
fiinding mismatches while the nation-wide presence of major banks has reduced 
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geographical concentrations. The high spread between mortgage rates and other 
interest rates has meant that mortgages have very attractive rates of return. The high 
costs ofcreating MBS ( credit enhancements, liquidity facilities, etc. ) would mean an 
erosion in the current high profitability of this business. Past experience in problems 
with the housing scheme underlying FANMAC bonds ( which have had the effect of 
accelerating payments ) has also slowed growth of the market. On the other hand, 
given the returns on these assets, the investors community in time may be willing to 
absorb an increased volume of offerings. 
It is expected that there will be further growth in the Australian MBS market. 
Volumes could grow even further ifthe major and regional banks decided to enter the 
market. Besides, the growth in Australian MBS issuance and pricing competition 
among issuers will likely lead to the development of more complex securities. 
Tranches may be structured to more closely match investors' specifications with the 
effect of widening the investor base for Australian MBS. The increasing volume of 
Australian MBS offered off-shore will also increase the investor base. 
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CHAPTERIII 
MORTGAGE MARKET EV HONG KONG 
In Chapter II，we discussed the situation and characteristics of mortgage 
market in major countries, which serve as a guideline and reference when analysing the 
case for Hong Kong. In this Chapter, we will scrutinise the situation for Hong Kong, 
in particular, we will try to link various factors to the mortgage corporation proposal in 
Hong Kong. 
Primary Mortgage Market condition in Hong Kong 
The demand for housing increases as the economic conditions of the colony 
improves. During the period 1980-1995, the demand of residential mortgage loans 
rises from HK$11.7 billion to HK$347.9 billion, which, as a percentage of Hong 
Kong's gross domestic product rose by 8.3% to 31.3% ( Ref. Table 8 ). Projection in 
the year 2000 to 2005 forecast that demand will be HK$837.1 billion to HK$1970.8 
billion. The mortgage loans will be as high as 50% of the GDP by the year 2005. 
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TABLE 1 
DEMAND OF RESmENTIAL MORTGAGE LOAN AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
OVER THE YEARS 
End ofYear Demand for residential mortgage loans As a % of GDP 
1980 r U 8.3 
1985 37.2 13.7 
1990 145.8 25 
1995 347.9 31.3 
Projection 
2000 837.1 40.0 
2005 1970.8 ‘ 50.0 
Source : Hong KongMonetary Authority 
Although the Government is increasing the payment for the first instalment of a 
mortgage loan to 30%，it does not seem to have an effective way to suppress the rising 
ofproperty price. This can be studied with the help ofthe following trend showing the 
volume of outstanding mortgage loans in Hong Kong over the past years : 
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Latest Residential Mortgage Conditions 
HKMA closely monitors the residential mortgage market through close 
surveillance of financial institution. Authorised institutions are required to submit 
reports on mortgage loan financing to HKMA on a regular basis. Residential 
mortgage loans for the purchase ofproperties in Hong Kong continued to grow rapidly 
in November, for example, according to the results of the monthly survey conducted 
by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, as shown in Table 9. 
The latest figures show that the total amount of outstanding mortgage lending 
by the 33 institutions in the survey rose by 1.8% in November ( 2.0% in October ) to 
$319.9 billion. ( The percentage change has been adjusted to allow for the 
reclassification of loans by an institution amounting to $0.4 billion during the month ). 
The growth rate is higher than the monthly average of 1.5% over the last twelve 
months. 
New loans approved during the month is the highest since the survey was first 
conducted in December 1992. However, the effect of this was offset by a 
corresponding increase in the amount of repayments which rose by 18.2% to $11.2 
billion in November. These figures reflect the refinancing of existing mortgages as well 
as demand for new mortgages arising from the continued buoyant residential property 
market in October. 
The annualised rate of growth in lending over the last three months increased 
to 20.1% from 14.7% in the three-month period to October. The twelve-month 
47 
average of outstanding loans showed an annualised growth rate of 17.6%, compared 
with 17.0% in October. 
The increase in lending in November follows the sharp upward movement in 
October. Prior to then the growth in lending had been on a declining trend for some 
months. At the same time，property prices, particularly those at the upper end of the 
market, have risen sharply in recent weeks and there are signs of renewed speculative 
activity. In this environment, the HKMA has urged institutions to exercise additional 
care in relation to their property exposure. They should look critically at their lending 
criteria, particularly in relation to the more expensive properties where the speculation 
has been most evident. As an overall policy, institutions should adhere strictly to the 
70% loan to value ratio in respect of their own lending exposure and should avoid 
arrangements which circumvent this ratio. A lower ratio than 70% will normally be 
appropriate for more expensive properties, and the valuation of such properties should 
be carefully examined. Institutions should also have regard to the debt-servicing ratio 
of the borrower and whether the property in question is to be owner-occupied or is 
being acquired for investment purposes. 
The amount of new loans approved but not yet drawn further increased over 
the already high base by $2.3 billion ( 20.2% ) to $13.8 billion in November. These 
figures, coupled with the increased activity in both the primary and secondary markets 
in November, suggest that residential mortgage loans are likely to continue to grow at 
a rapid rate in December. 
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The amount ofresidential mortgage loans associated with co-financing schemes 
accounted for 3.8% of total mortgage lending of the 33 surveyed institutions at end-
November. Ofthe $20.8 billion new loans approved during November, about 83.5% 
were accounted for by properties aged 15 years or below. 
Lending for the purchase of properties in China increased by 1.1% to $6.0 
billion in November. Gross loans made in November decreased both in number ( to 
178 from 348 ) and in amount ( to $161 million from $216 million ). New loans 
approved in November also decreased both in number ( to 246 from 319 ) and in 
amount ( to $273 million from $286 million ). 
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TABLE 1 
RESULT OF THE NOVEMBER 1996 SURVEY ON RESn)ENTIAL MORTGAGE 
LOANS m HONG KONG 
Nw 0^ 
1996 1996 
HK$ Mn HK$ Mn 
33 authorised institutions 
1. Outstanding Lending 
a. Amount 319,902 313,886 
b. Monthly Change 1-8% ** 2.0% 
c. Twelve - month change 17.6% ** 17.0% 
d. Average change (annualised) 
Latest three months 20.1% ** 14.7% 
Latest twelve months 17.6% ** 17.0% 
Associated with co-financing schemes 
-amount 12,249 11,037 
-number 6570 6022 
2. Gross loans made during month 
a. Amount 16,807 15,499 
b. Number 11180 10578 
3 New loans approved during month 
a. Amount 20,771 18,264 
b. Number 12965 11588 
By property age 
Property age -15 years or below 
a. Amount 17,353 15,439 
b. Number 10371 9351 
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Property age - above 15 years 
a. Amount 3,418 2,825 
b. Number 2594 2237 
Associated with co-financing schemes 
a. Amount 806 715 
b. Number 414 360 
4 New loans approved during month but not yet drawn 
a. Amount 13,841 11,517 
b. Number 8448 7179 
Source : Hong KongMonetary Authority 
**Adjustedfor the effect ofreclassification of residential mortgage loans by an institution amounting 
to HK$0.4 billion. 
Mortgage Securitization experience in Hong Kong 
As emphasised in the above sections, securitization is still very new to the 
Hong Kong market. There were only four issues ofMBS in Hong Kong so far, all of 
them were of CMO type. The total size is HK$3 billion with individual size ranged 
from HK$350 million to HK$1,000 million. Of these four issues, three involved 
mortgages originated by banks ( Bank of America, Citibank and Standard Chartered 
Bank ). The other involved mortgages originated by a finance company which is an 
affiliate of a property developer ( Cheung Kong ). As residential mortgages in Hong 
Kong are predominantly arranged on floating rate terms, the four issues ofMBS are 
also on floating rate terms. The coupon rates on the MBS were set mostly with 
reference to HffiOR except that for the Cheung Kong issue which are set with 




HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY'S MBS MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
Survey on Primary Market by HKMA 
In order to realise the potential of developing the secondary market for MBS in 
Hong Kong, it is necessary to get empirical information on the primary mortgage 
market so as to justify and forecast the development. In October 1994，HKMA 
conducted a survey on residential mortgage loans by collecting information from a 
total of33 authorised institutions. Those authorised institutions are active participants 
in the residential mortgage market and account for above 90% of total residential 
mortgage loans in Hong Kong. 
The result of the survey are summarised into 3 sections. They are the 
characteristics of the residential mortgage loans, performance of the loans, and the 
lending policy of authorised institutions. 
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Findings ofthe Survey 
Characteristics ofresidential mortgage loans 
There was a total of 338,249 residential mortgage loans at the end of 
September 1994. Ofthe total private housing stock in Hong Kong, around 40% had 
an outstanding mortgage. The average outstanding amount per loan was $787,000. 
The ratio of outstanding loan to valuation was 53.3% The profile of the age of the 
loans can be classified into three tiers : 68.2% of them was of less than 10 years, 
22.8% ofthem was within 10 to 20 years while the remaining 9% was longer than 20 
years. 
On average, the life ofthe mortgage loan was 15.2 years. 94.5% ofthe loan 
was aimed at financing the purchase of flats, the others were all refinancing loans. One 
of the important characteristics is the interest payment structure, 96% of them was 
floating rate based, only 4% was of fixed rate. 
Performance ofMortgage Loans 
A very low loan delinquency/default rate, less than 0.5% of the total number, 
was observed from the survey. A very important implication was that, when 
comparing with other countries, the mortgage loan in Hong Kong is of very good 
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quality. This, in tum, affects the pricing of the MBS since a lower premium may be 
possible due to the relative high quality ofthe mortgage loans. 
Lending Policy 
For the financial institutions studied, the maximum loan-to-valuation ratio has 
changed, due to the cap on the ratio imposed by the Government in 1991. For small to 
medium flats, the ratio dropped from 88.5% in 1990 to 69.5% in September 1994. For 
luxurious flats, the ratio dropped from 87.1% in 1990 to 54.8% in September 1994. In 
fact, the ratios remain roughly the same up to now, as there was not much change in 
the Government imposed limit on the ratio for banks. 
Implications of the Survey Findings 
Comparison with Benchmark Pool 
Taking the Hong Kong mortgage-backed criteria published by Standard & 
Pool's in November 1994 as a benchmark pool for comparing with the survey findings 
as shown, it was found that the standards set out by Standard & Pool's is basically in 
line with the average loan characteristics of the Hong Kong mortgage market, or even 
better in some aspects; for example, smaller loan-to-valuation ratio, shorter contractual 
life. Smaller loan-to-valuation ratio implies less volatile to the fluctuation of property 
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price while shorter contractual life indicates less vulnerable to the variation of interest 
rate. It will be elaborated in the following section. Except the valuation of property, 
in general, the loan characteristics of the loans in Hong Kong mortgage market is 
better than the benchmark by Standard & Pool's. 
TABLE 10 
COMPARISON WITH BENCHMARK POOL 
Stand&PoolsBenchmarkPool Survey Findings on Loan 
Characteristics 
Loan Size (HK$) max. 3 m 0.787 m 
Loan-to-valuation ratio 70% 53.3% 
Property age < 10 years < 10 years 
Contractual life max. 20 years 15.3 years 
Occupancy status owner-occupied generally owner-occupied 
Valuation ofproperty by a registered chartered surveyor 82% by independent valuation 
agents 
Source : Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Quality ofResidential Mortgage 
Low Default Risk 
The survey findings gives figures to support the market expectation on the low loan 
default/delinquency, which is around 0.43% of the outstanding loan amount. 
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Compared with the delinquency rate ofFNMA and FHLMC in the US: 2.84% and 
3.46% for multi-family mortgages in 1993, the loan default in Hong Kong is extremely 
low. 
Low Loan-to-valuation Ratio 
53.3% loan-valuation ratio means that there is a 46.7% downwards margin for a slump 
ofthe property price until mortgagors might give up their mortgage loan. Therefore, 
lower the ratio is, less the loan default/delinquency will be. 
Lending Policy of Authorised Institutions 
In response to the rocket rise of the property price in the past few years, authorised 
institutions execute more tight and prudential lending policies by lowering the loan-
valuation ratio; in other words, it lowers the default risk ofmortgagees. 
Reliability of the Survey Findings 
Although the survey findings is so encouraging on development of the 
secondary market for MBS in Hong Kong, it may be just an illusion and may not 
reflect the particular situation of mortgage market in Hong Kong. 
Some ofthe mortgage loan samples submitted by the 33 authorised institutions 
were originated several years before the rocket rise of property market and the loan-to-
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valuation ratio is comparatively low. Even though there were some newly arranged 
loans, some mortgagors did not borrow up to the maximum ratio of 70% by ploughing 
back some ofthe capital they gained when they traded up the market during a rise of 
property price. Consequently, these two factors achieve a low default/delinquency 
loan since mortgagors have a big margin for a property price drop before mortgagees 
give up their loan. 
Secondly, the 70% of loan-to-valuation ratio and the maximum 20 years of 
contractual life ofloan are the policies formulated, or precisely speaking, regulated by 
the mortgagors with an implicit agreement with the Government. Therefore, it can 
foresee that the survey findings cannot exceed these limits. It can be better but not 
worse. 
In other words, banks had adopted policies which minimise their risks and 
maximise their returns on mortgage loan business by reducing the loan-to-valuation 
ratio, shortening contractual life of loans and widening interest spread. That is to say 
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the survey findings merely reflect a distorted rather than a true picture ofthe mortgage 
market in Hong Kong. Especially, when the supply of properties in Hong Kong is 
controlled by several huge property developers and the supply of mortgage loans is 
controlled by the banks, the direction of the mortgage market much depends on the 
bargaining power among property developers and banks. As long as the property price 
keeps rising, the default risk on mortgage loan can be negligible. Then, both banks and 
property developers get the mutual benefits. 
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Nevertheless, the Government also exerts intervention on them because the 
property price will directly affect the government income on selling lands. On the 
other hand, the Government also needs to give pressure to the major property players 
when there are too many grievances in the society if they drive the market too far from 
the actual status. Thus, the equilibrium point of the market is determined by the tripod 
ofproperty developers, bankers and the Government. 
The Mortgage Corporation Approach 
To develop the secondary mortgage market, one ofthe alternatives is to set up 
a mortgage corporation. The mortgage corporation can help improve the efficiency of 
the real-estate financing in several aspects: 
1. Funds can be mobilised from capital market investors to the housing market 
2. Through the purchase of mortgages as well as the issuance of MBS by the 
mortgage corporation, the liquidity of mortgages is enhanced. Investors are more 
willing to enter into this market. 
3. The mortgage corporation can target on the types of mortgages it acquires. In this 
way, it can help to assist in the implementation of housing policies. For instance, 
the US mortgage corporations have participated in lending programmes to 
promote home ownership among the low and middle income groups. 
4. In stipulating the terms and conditions of the purchase of mortgage loans, 
mortgage corporations have considerable influence over the underwriting standards 
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of mortgage loans in the primary mortgage market. This may in turn have a 
positive impact on the quality ofmortgage loan origination. 
By stabilising the funding of mortgages, mortgage corporations help 
stimulating the loan originators to offer more choices to home buyers, such as fixed 
rate mortgages or combined fixed-rate ( for a period ) and thereafter adjustable rate 
mortgages. 
Mortgage Corporation Proposal 
After collect and analysing the result from the survey, the Exchange Fund 
Advisory Committee has given approval in principle to the setting up of a mortgage 
corporation. The mortgage corporation plan was announced in July 1996 with initial 
structure as follows : 
(a) the mortgage corporation would be owned by the Government initially through the 
Exchange Fund with a capital base of HK$1 Billion; 
(b) the corporation would be a limited company established under the Companies 
Ordinance; and 
(c) the corporation would develop its business in two phases, starting with the 
purchase of mortgage loans for its own portfolio, followed by the issue of 
mortgage-backed securities. 
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The decision to establish a mortgage corporation was made following a two-
month consultation exercise that ended in mid-June. During the consultation period, 
the HKMA convened a number of briefings and discussions with the various 
institutions and industry associations to explain the proposal and to receive comments. 
In addition, written comments on the proposal were received from 23 
organisations/individuals from a wide spectrum of the community including the 
banking sector, capital market participants, real estate developers, political groups and 
academics. 
HKMA commented that the overall reaction was very favourable, indicating 
broad agreement that the establishment ofamortgage corporation would contribute to 
banking and monetary stability, debt market development and home financing. There 
was also strong support for initial government ownership of the corporation in 
securing the acceptance and recognition ofthe corporation by the market. 
Some comments and concerns have been expressed on specific aspects of the 
mortgage corporation proposal, including notably the projection of the shortfall in 
mortgage funds, the effects of the corporation on banks' mortgage lending business, 
the impact on the property sector, the risk management issues, the corporate structure 
,the involvement ofHKMA, as well as the features of the debt securities to be issued 
by the mortgage corporation. 
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Projection ofthe shortfall in mortgage funds 
There were mixed views on HKMA's projection of the potential shortfall in 
mortgage funds. Some banks believed that HKMA have overstated the magnitude of 
the shortfall while an academic economist considers the projection as reasonable. As 
HKMA have cautioned in the consultation paper, the assumptions used in the 
projection are inevitably crude. HKMA was not seeking to give a precise forecast on 
the potential shortfall. Rather, the projection was intended to illustrate that there was 
likely to be a substantial shortfall ifthe home ownership ratio in HK continued to rise 
as in the case ofthe USA and the UK. HKMA had also assessed the requirement for 
mortgage funds from the housing production angle, using the completion of 60,000 
private residential units per annum in the next ten years. HKMA accepted that this 
figure was only a target towards which Government was seeking to achieve. There 
was no guarantee that this production programme would not slip�However, on the 
basis of these two approaches, HKMA was convinced that the shortfall of mortgage 
funding was likely to be substantial in the next ten years. 
It has been argued by some banks that since the banking system has been able 
to meet the demand for mortgage funds adequately in the past, there was no reason 
why it could not continue to do so in the future. HKMA did not agree with this 
argument because the exposure of the banking system to property related loans, 
including residential mortgages, has risen steadily from 26% in 1980 to 39% in 1995. 
Unless a secondary mortgage market is developed through the setting up of the 
mortgage corporation, the concentration risk of the banking system is going to 
increase beyond a prudent level. The constraints that the banking system is facing in 
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originating more mortgage loans are structural in nature due to the significant maturity 
mismatch between the deposit base and mortgage loans. Although one can argue that 
the aggregate deposit base has grown and will continue to grow steadily, the 
concentration and liquidity risks of individual institutions are significant risks because 
ofpossible migration ofdeposits from one institution to another. 
Impact on banks' mortgage business 
One ofthe concerns expressed by some banks is possible cherry-picking by the 
mortgage corporation，i.e. the corporation would pick the best quality mortgage loans 
from the banks' portfolios, thereby resulting in a deterioration in the overall quality of 
the remaining mortgage loans held by the banks. This concern stems from a 
misunderstanding on the way in which the mortgage corporation would operate. The 
mortgage corporation loans which conform to these standards are eligible for purchase 
by the mortgage corporation. It would be up to individual banks to offer a pool of 
conforming mortgage loans for sale to the mortgage corporation. Moreover, the 
minimum purchasing standards to be adopted by the mortgage corporation are likely to 
reflect the industry standards, which means that the loan portfolios retained by the 
banks would not necessarily be of inferior quality. Indeed, to the extent that banks 
seek to sell their mortgages for liquidity purposes, the existence of standards would 
encourage them to increase their credit quality. 
The banking sector worried that the additional mortgage funds may result in 
excessive competition and a lowering of profit margin in banks' mortgage lending 
business. HKMA believed that banks need not worry unduly as the mortgage 
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corporation is more likely to reduce the upward pressure on mortgage lending rates 
rather than force the rates to go down, if the demand of mortgage funds continues to 
grow as expected. Moreover，the mortgage corporation will complement rather than 
compete with banks, as it will not originate mortgage loans and will only purchase 
mortgage loans from the authorised institutions under the Banking Ordinance. 
Impact on the property sector 
There are mixed views on the impact of mortgage corporation on the property 
sector. But it is generally considered that a mortgage corporation operating on a 
prudent and commercial basis would not by itself lead to a sharp rise in property 
prices, as long as the banks continue to adopt a prudent lending policy and there is a 
steady supply ofnew residential properties. 
Impact on the Government 
One of the concerns on the proposal is that the mortgage corporation may 
entail substantial risks to the Government. HKMA believes that these concerns stem 
from some misunderstanding ofthe nature ofmortgage lending, which has always had 
a very low default rate. In purchasing the mortgage loans, the mortgage corporation 
transfers as well as transforms the risks of such loans. Unlike banks which rely mainly 
on short-term customer deposits and interbank borrowings to fund long-term 
mortgages, the mortgage corporation borrows long-term funds to finance mortgage 
loan purchases, and is therefore not incurring maturity mismatch between its assets ( 
mortgage loans ) and liabilities ( debt obligations ). 
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Corporate structure and the involvement ofthe HKMA 
There are mixed views on whether the mortgage corporation should be set up 
as a limited company under the Companies Ordinance or as a statutory corporation. 
HKMA believe that the former approach is more appropriate. The corporation will not 
need assume any statutory power or functions. Moreover, to set up the corporation as 
a limited company will remove the concerns of the banking sector that the corporation 
may possess statutory power to coerce banks to sell their mortgages. There will also 
be greater flexibility in widening the ownership structure of the corporation at a later 
stage should it bejudged appropriate� 
There have been some questions on whether the involvement ofthe HKMA in 
the operation of he mortgage corporation would gibe rise to a role conflict for the 
HKMA as a bank supervisor. HKMA believe such concerns can best be addressed by 
having a high degree oftransparency in the operation of the mortgage corporation and 
having a Board ofDirectors with broad representation drawn from the private sector, 
such as the banking sector, capital markets, property sector, and independent 
professionals etc. 
It has been suggested that there is a need for a regulatory authority to ensure 
the prudent management of the mortgage corporation. Yet, HKMA suggested that it 
is necessary or appropriate to do so. Firstly the mortgage corporation does not have 
any franchise or monopoly in the business that it seeks to do. Also, the securities 
which it issues would be subject to the general framework set up for the protection of 
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investors. The Government, through the HKMA, would act as the overseer of the 
corporation, although the day-to-day management would be subject to the direction of 
the Board ofDirectors. There would be adequate mandate as defined its memorandum 
and Articles of Association and would operate on a prudent and profitable basis. 
Issuance ofdebt securities by the mortgage corporation 
In general, market participant have some uncertainty about the structure and 
arrangements for the debt securities to be issued by the mortgage corporation. Some 
market participants have suggested that a favourable rating, a low risk weight for 
capital adequacy purpose, and some forms of tax concession will increased investor's 
appetite for the paper. To enhance the liquidity of the paper, it has been further 
suggested that a suitable market making system should be put in place and that the 
paper should be accepted as eligible Repo securities for discounting under LAF. The 
HKMA would work closely with the capital market participants and the institutional 
investors to determine the most appropriate structure and arrangements for the debt 
securities to be issued. 
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CHAPTERV 
EMPLICATIONS OF MBS DEVELOPMENT TO HONG KONG 
Property Market 
There are concerns as to whether the development of secondary mortgage 
market will exert upward pressure on property price. Mortgage securitization helps 
direct more funds into property market. It may in turn stimulate the origination of 
mortgage loans, resulting in greater demand for property and hence higher property 
prices. 
In general, authorised institutions which are keen to securitise their mortgages 
are often those wishing to reduce their exposure to property sector. Therefore it is 
likely that bank resources so released will at least partly be diversified into other lines 
of business. Hong Kong Monetary Authority has been encouraging authorised 
institutions to keep annual growth in property-related lending to not more than the rate 
ofnominal GDP growth, and to stabilise or reduce the share of such loans to not more 
than 40% of domestic loans. Thus, resources may not concentrate in property market 
to increase the property prices. It is considered that a mortgage corporation would not 
by itselflead to a sharp rise in property prices, as long as the banks continue to adopt a 
prudent lending policy and there is a steady supply of new residential properties. 
If proper fijnding channels for long term loans are not developed, other less 
prudent forms of mortgage financing may emerge. For example, real estate developers 
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may diversify into business of providing mortgage loans or home-buyers may seek 
overdraft loans to finance their home purchase. Conversely, a properly established 
secondary mortgage market will provide an avenue to raise long-term funds for 
mortgages. 
Also, mortgage corporation help to even the flows of funds into property 
market. For example, it can reduce its purchase ofmortgages during a property boom 
and increase the purchase in times of market recession. Yet there are objections as 
how far the mortgage can achieve this regulating function. When property prices are 
going down, banks may want to sell off their mortgages to the mortgage corporation, 
but the corporation would be more defensive when prices are falling because they do 
not want to buy mortgages with falling values. Likewise, with rising property values, 
banks would be more reluctant to sell their mortgages to the corporation as the 
underlying value is growing. 
Banking Sector 
On the banking side, as we have described, MBS reduces concentration risk by 
spreading the risks to holders outside the banking system. Second, it spreads the risks 
within the banking system by enabling banks that do not engage in direct mortgage 
lending to participate in the mortgage market. 
The maturity and liquidity profile of the originating bank can be improved by 
reducing the proportion of property loans in the loan book. In order to meet the 
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requirement ofmortgage corporation, banks would improve their credit standards and 
documentation in loan origination. This, in turn, brings more robust financial situation 
for the banks. Banks will see their credit risks diffused. Also through origination and 
servicing fees they should receive from the government, they will bring in a new, 
"annuity-like stream ofrevenue" without increasing their percentage ofloans. 
The secondary mortgage corporation also enables the many foreign banks that 
want to enter the Hong Kong mortgage sector to acquire high-yield assets without the 
large operational costs of establishing a retail business. 
Mortgage corporation is more likely to reduce the upward pressure on 
mortgage leading rates rather than force the rates to go down, if the demand for 
mortgage funds continues to grow as expected. Moreover, the mortgage corporation 
will complement rather than compete with banks as it will only purchase mortgage 
loans from the authorised institutions under the Banking Ordinance. 
MBS also carries risk of giving incentive for authorised institutions to 
overexpand their loan book in the expectation ofbeing able to securities. But a lot of 
local banks themselves hold a different view. For many banks, mortgage-related 
lending is both a core activity and their most profitable source of earning. They see no 
need for a mortgage corporation. Furthermore, there is no reason why banks which 
reach the limit of 40% of their total loan portfolio cannot securitise their own 
mortgage for sale to investors： 
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One concem of banks is how much they will be paid for the mortgages they 
hold. This is especially important in light of the currently fierce competition among 
banks to make home loans. There is worry that institutions, by securitising their best 
assets, ends up with an overall reduction in asset quality. The HKMA comforts them 
that it would be up to individual banks to offer sale to the mortgage corporation. The 
minimum purchasing standards to be adopted by the mortgage corporation are likely to 
reflect the industry standards, which means that the loan portfolios retained by the 
banks would not necessarily be ofinferior quality. 
There is also danger of non-controlled proliferation of mortgage securitization 
by non-banking entities ( e.g. by property developers ) which may weaken the banking 
system by encouraging disintermediation. 
Other criticism include the operation of mortgage corporation as a wholly-
owned government subsidiary. There are complaints from the banks that the HKMA is 
creating a false market, in the sense that banks have no desire to sell on mortgage loans 
at present. It effectively obliges banks to do so in return for a paltry 20 basis points in 
operating fees, then it is depriving them ofincome. 
In order to have benefits outweigh risks, appropriate supervisory standards and 
healthy track on market development process are mandatory. Anyway, with the 
government mortgage-buying corporation still in 'a rather embryonic' state, it is 
believed that banks will not see benefits for at least the next three to five years. 
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Consumers 
There are a few important consequences to consumers. Firstly, it lowers 
mortgage rate as improved liquidity in mortgage loans reduces risk premium on such 
loans. Secondly, when MBS is a popular investment instrument, it increases 
availability of mortgage funds by attracting funds from non-bank sectors. However, 
the two beneficial results may lead to increasing demand on properties, in turn increase 
property prices. Unless supply of housing stock increases, the benefits may be offset 
by the higher property prices. 
It is expected that the secondary mortgage corporations can assist in the 
implementation of housing policy by promoting mortgage financing for a specific 
targeted groups of home buyers, such as lower income people. The way to do is by 
purchasing a particular types of mortgages. The problem is the conflict of interest 
between financial and social role. Taking the same example，mortgages for lower-
income social group may have higher default rate. 
Debt Market 
MBS will be a new instrument for the debt market. This is very important in 
Hong Kong as the debt market is not well-developed. The prime object of the 
mortgage securitization is to intermediate long-term savings such as insurance and 
pension fiinds to meet the rising demand for long-term mortgages. However, the 
insurance and pension funds industries in Hong Kong are still nascent, and already 
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have a range of highly rated government-backed bonds from the HKMA itself, the 
Mass Transit Railway Corporation, the Airport Authority and the Housing Authority. 
Further to that, many pension fonds still prefer Asian equity markets to debt 
markets, because of the greater volatility and higher potential returns. Even those 
Hong Kong pension funds that do invest in bonds often choose US Treasury Paper 
over Hong Kong dollar-determined bonds. This is because the peg linking the Hong 
Kong dollar to the US dollar eliminates most foreign exchange risk for those 
companies that must pay customers in Hong Kong dollars. Investors would not bother 
investing in Asia since he can hold Treasury Paper without any exchange risk. They 
can get higher return on the long end in the US market, where longer maturities are 
available. 
Moreover, a number of institutional investors would prefer fixed rate assets. 
But as high as 96% of outstanding mortgage loans in Hong Kong are on floating rate 
terms. The government will have to pay generous yields to woo investors away from 
other safe, fixed-income investment. 
The four mortgage-backed bonds issued in Hong Kong between 1993 and 
1995 generated a very lukewarm response. This was partly because the premium were 
not considered adequate to offset the risk that the maturity of the bond could change 
based on market conditions. Also some investors have adopted a wait and see attitude 
because they are not familiar with the product. 
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An uncertain payback period is also considered a risk of mortgage backed 
securities that ranks in scale with default. 
Since the mortgage corporation would be 100% government-owned at the 
start, concerns have been raised that mortgage-backed securities would compete 
directly for investment dollars with the HKMA's Exchange Fund notes and the Mass 
Transit Railway Corp.'s ( MTRC ) notes, which share the A3 Hong Kong sovereign 
credit rating issued by Moody's Investors Service Inc. But HKMA insists that the 
market is large enough that there is no competition between that mortgage corporation 
and existing MTRC or Exchange Fund paper. 
In long run, the hand-over of sovereignty ofHong Kong to China in July 1997 
might fuel interest in Hong Kong dollar-denominated bonds, by throwing doubts on 
the solidity ofthe peg. It is expected that as there would not be two currencies in one 
country forever, the peg will have to go. Investors have to start thinking about gaining 
exposure in Hong Kong dollar-denominated assets to match Hong Kong dollar 
liabilities. 
The new market's success will be the ability to attract major investors in long-
term fixed income products, including pension funds, life insurance companies and 
other offshore investor. In the aspect, the proposal has come at the right time since the 




FACTORS mFLUENCEVG ADOPTION OF MBS JN HONG KONG 
Having look at the characteristics ofMBS product and the market situation in 
Hong Kong, it is believed that there are two main issues on the market development of 
MBS. The first one is the asset quality while the second one is the liquidity of the 
MBS. 
Asset Quality 
It is clear that MBS is a fairly new product in Hong Kong's financial market. 
The paper must be of good quality to gain acceptance among investors. As from the 
experience ofintroducing the Exchange Fund Bills and Notes, which is very successful 
in the market, by the HKMA, it is anticipated that MBS should not entail much 
difficulties to the introduction regarding operational issues. There is a real threat that 
if sub-quality paper is issued in the market at a time when the investing public are not 
yet sophisticated enough in these products, a few non-performing issues might have 
adverse effect on market development. 
The asset quality of mortgage-backed securities is affected by two main factors 
：quality of the underlying mortgage pool and the credit enhancement provided. The 
underlying mortgage pool constitutes the assets upon which the cash flows are 
generated. The quality of the mortgage pool is, in tum, affected by the overall 
performance of the property market and by the characteristics of individual loans. 
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Quality of underlying mortgage pool 
The underlying mortgage is affected by the overall performance ofthe property 
market. The quality of underlying mortgage pool is determined by many factors 
including loan-to-valuation ratio, year of seasoning, occupancy status, loan purpose, 
mortgagees' background, property age, presence of mortgage insurance, type of 
mortgages, etc. 
From the HKMA survey illustrated in the Chapter IV, it is found that the loan-
to-valuation ratio, occupancy status, loan purpose, mortgagees' background, and 
property age give a great support on the quality of the underlying mortgage pool. On 
the other hand, the loan characteristics is quite competitive with the standard used in 
Standard & Pool,s benchmark pooL It is a very important factor for supporting the 
MBS introduction in Hong Kong and attracting customers world-wide. In fact, the 
years of seasoning, geographical location of the mortgages, types of mortgages also 
play a very important role in deciding the asset quality. 
The standards used in Standard & PooPs benchmark pool with respect to Hong 
Kong have been considered by the HKMA. Mortgage pools that compare more 
favourably to this benchmark will be rated more favourably and vice versa. Very often 
credit support is provided to upgrade the quality of the MBS, particularly when the 




Credit enhancement is the amount of "capital" provided by mortgage sellers as 
backing for potential default by the mortgagors. In order to give a better protection to 
MBS investors, the MBS issuers needs to offer a higher level of credit enhancement 
but this will increase the cost of issue. It is expected that the credit enhancement is 
likely to be in excess of 10% of the pool of mortgages to be sold, simply because the 
market in Hong Kong is new and needs to build its image, brand and creditability. 
From the US experience, several forms of credit enhancement are possible. 
Credit enhancement can be provided by senior/subordinated class securities. 
Senior/subordinated structure, which is a form of "internal" credit enhancement, can 
generate cashflows to subordinate other cashflows of securities in other classes. 
Depending on the amount ofthe cashflows placed in the subordinated class, the senior 
class may be graded with a higher investment-grade rating. The second method is to 
share the risk with a third party. The third party may be an mortgage insurer，who will 
bear certain amount of credit losses. Or, it may be a corporation, who may guarantee 
reimbursement of losses on a mortgage pool up to a specified amount. The third 
method is to give credit support by the interest spread between the interest paid on the 
mortgages and that paid to MBS holders. Either one or a combination of them can be 
usefiil for credit enhancement. 
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Prepayment Risk 
Prepayment risk is inherent in mortgage loans usually. An increase in mortgage 
prepayment will cause losses to the MBS holders since they are unable to replace their 
MBS with other paper with the same high yield. Since the majority of mortgages in 
Hong Kong are arranged on floating rate basis, prepayment does not occur during an 
interest fall, but instead，during a rally of property market because property owners 
trade up the market. In rating MBS in Hong Kong, Standard & Poor,s policy is to 
encourage issuers to allocate the risk to the MBS issue at senior class. It requires that 
all prepayments be allocated to the senior class in the first five years of the pool's life. 
As a result ofthe highest risk period in the first five years, the paydown period ofthe 
senior tranche is accelerated. 
Liquidity 
Liquidity of the MBS market determines how easy the securities can be 
converted into cash. The higher degree ofliquidity in the securities, larger the investor 
base and lower the borrowing cost. It will in turn encourage issues and trading 
activities. The MBS market in Hong Kong is at an early stage of development. As 
described above, only four issues involving a total amount of $3 billion have been , 
concluded up to 1995 and secondary market activity is thin. There is a general 
consensus among market participants that the following factors are crucial to the level 
of trading interests in MBS : 
(a) overall market size and size of individual issues; 
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(b) degree of standardisation ofthe MBS; 
(c) credit rating; and 
(d) transparency ofthe underlying mortgage pool. 
Clearly, in order to attract more investors and gain wider acceptance, more 
attention must be paid on the above issues. 
Market Size 
It is unrealistic to expect a high level of secondary market activity in the early 
stages ofthe development ofthe MBS market. In fact, it may not be cost-effective for 
a financial institution to set up a trading desk for MBS if there are insufficient 
securities to trade. 
Clearly, HKMA has to pay attention to maintaining the market size and 
increase it subsequently. The threshold beyond which trading activity begins to pick 
up varies considerably among different markets. Under conducive market conditions ( 
where products are easy to trade and market infrastructure is efficient ), the initial 
increase in trading activities quickly builds up its own momentum, culminating in a 
take-offin the secondary market. 
The size of individual issues may also affect secondary market liquidity. 
Traders may not have an incentive to make a market if the issue size is small and the 
paydown of mortgage loans is fast. Nonetheless, provided that the MBS market as a 
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whole has attained a certain size, a small issue with a conforming mortgage pool may 
be able to achieve a higher liquidity than a larger issue with a non-conforming pool. 
Standardisation 
Standardisation ofdocumentation and market practice is a process ofmortgage 
securitization and it is a necessary procedure in order to establish the brand name 
world-wide and give confidence to international investors. Conformity of underlying 
mortgage pool to certain loan standards and standardisation of the MBS can ease the 
effort of traders and investors to understand the characteristics of issues and in turn 
lower the transaction cost. 
Presently both the primary and the secondary mortgage markets in Hong Kong 
are quite diversified. Although complex structures may cater to specific investors, they 
do not serve the general market needs. In the introduction stage, there will likely be a 
convergence towards some basic forms of standards over time，driven by the 
requirements ofcredit rating agencies and by investor preference. 
While some standardised practice will gradually evolve, the process of 
standardisation may possibly be speeded up through collective, industry wide efforts. 
The areas where collective efforts can achieve better results than individual efforts will 
need to be carefully identified by the industry. Alternatively, the presence of a "Fannie 
Mae" type of mortgage corporation in Hong Kong to standardise MBS issues will 
significantly improve the liquidity of such product. 
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Credit Rating 
In order to attract international investors, it is necessary to have an 
international rating agency to grade the MBS. The cost implication to hire an 
international rating agency indicates that it may not be cost-effective to rate an issue 
smaller than HK$500 million. It is also observed that MBS guaranteed by the 
government usually attracts more trading interests due to the enhancement of credit 
quality. 
Transparency 
The quality of the underlying mortgage pool of a rated MBS issue may 
deteriorate when there is a change in the pattern ofloan prepayment and delinquency. 
Therefore, it is necessary to remove the barrier due to information asymmetry among 
MBS market players so as to improve the market efficiency. Essential information on 
loan performance to traders on regular basis or through the distribution of real-time 
computer network can improve the information velocity and increase the transparency 
ofthe market activities. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPmiCAL FEVDEVGS 
Objective 
In order to verify the above analysis and to understand the real market 
situation, a survey is done in the market to collect some information about the project. 
The result allows us to make more detailed recommendations to HKMA in carrying 
out the project. In view of the unique nature of the product in Hong Kong, personal 
interviews may not be an effective / efficient to achieve the purpose and mail survey 
approach is used. 
The objective ofthe survey is to investigate the attitude of the group oftarget 
market participants for MBS in Hong Kong. As the product is expected to be traded 
within institutional investors only, a tentative set of target recipients were identified in 
the following fields : commercial bank, investment bank, asset management company, 
mutual fund company, insurance company, corporate investment firm and brokerage 
firm. It is anticipated that this type of identification will give an attempt to broadly 
cover the key players of the product. 
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Target Respondents Sampling 
The target sample size for this questionnaire research is 30 to 40 which is 
considered to be reasonable due to the narrow range of target groups. In order to get 
sufficient responses, 120 copies ofquestionnaires were distributed, mostly to friends in 
the finance industry and some partners at work. This ensures the responses fall on the 
category that we defined. 
Owing to the nature of the MBS product, the target recipients of the 
questionnaire have to be carefully selected. One thing being that with constraint ofthe 
objective of the questionnaire, it could only be sent to the addressees of substantial 
seniority, our threshold for this being mid-management level. This is because the 
addressee should be someone making decisions in the company, or at least he knows 
the direction and initiatives of the company clearly. 
Survey Design 
The questionnaire consists of three sections : Section one focused on the 
current situation on the use ofMBS in the company of the respondent. Section two 
was composed of questions ofthe personal opinions on the MBS development in Hong 
Kong and Section three aimed at collecting some demographic information on the 
respondent and the company. 
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The design ofthe questionnaire was furnished mainly on a descriptive basis. It 
was expected that the result would reflect the viewpoint of the general public, through 
the results obtained from Section II of the questionnaire, which is a 5-point scale 
framework. The significance ofthe result lies on the fact that our target group consists 
mostly of market participants. 
Results from Section I of the questionnaire will give a proportion of the 
companies already dealing with any asset-backed securities or mortgage-backed 
securities and the purpose of such. Various factors are to be ranked by them in the 
order ofimportance for the development ofMBS. 
Section II was divided into five parts. The first part asked the target's opinion 
on the impact of the MBS development on customers. The second part asked about 
the impact ofits development on the property market. Third part is on its impact on 
the banking sector. The next part asked about the impact ofMBS development on the 
debt market. Lastly, a general viewpoint of the target on the MBS development in 
Hong Kong by the HKMA was assessed. In all parts within this section, scale of 1 to 5 
represents "Agree strongly", "Agree", "Neutral", “Disagree”，and "Disagree strongly" 
respectively. 
The last section was a series of general questions aiming at obtaining the 




It is expected that return rate ofthe questionnaires will be low due to the fact 
that most of the recipients are busy senior managers. Taking care of this, a total of 
120 questionnaires have been sent out to a group of personnel that have potential 
chance ofparticipating in the market ofMBS. The number of questionnaires returned 
is 33, representing a return rate of 27.5%. 
The Opinion Survey on Mortgage Backed Securities Development posed 
questions on the degree ofutilisation of MBS in Hong Kong and the general attitude 
towards the MBS development in Hong Kong. The survey results suggested that most 
of the financial market participants had little or no participation in MBS activities. 
Many of the respondents did not have a clear idea on mortgage securities. Thus, 
HKMA needs to pay more efforts on the MBS promotion and possibly offer courses / 
educational programs to market participants. Most of the respondents indicated that 
the quality ofunderlying mortgage, credit rating and secondary market liquidity as the 
most important considerations for their participation in MBS market. Since the 
mortgage quality in Hong Kong is quite good, the market development should focus 
on credit rating enhancement and secondary market formation. Regarding the 
preference on the type of MBS ( fixed rate or floating rate ), the results from this 
survey were mixed and fiarther work needs to be done to study the preference of the 
market participants. 
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The results generally supported the view that mortgage securitization would 
bring benefits to the end customer by channelling long term funds to housing sector 
and eliminating other non-healthy forms of mortgage financing. Yet, there was no 
clear indication that the MBS market helped to implement specific type of housing 
policies. There was also worry among the respondents that the MBS development 
might drive up property prices. 
Contrary to common belief, it was found that banks were willing to sell their 
mortgages even though mortgage lending was their prime activity and they had 
adequate capital Most respondents supported the view that mortgage securitization 
would reduce the concentration risk of banks. Yet, there were some worries that 
securitization might weaken the banks' role by encouraging disintermediation and the 
possible abuse by banks to over-expand their loan bank. 
• The results on the market acceptance by institutional investors were rather 
mixed. It is expected that HKMA needs to enhance the promotion efforts to debt 
market players in order to increase the acceptance of the instrument. 
The results tended to support HKMA in the development ofMBS market and 
most respondents were positive about the future outlook of the instrument. 
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Use ofMortgage Backed Securities in Hong Kong ( Section I，Question 1 - 6 ) 
The survey showed that most of the institutions did not participate in any form 
of Asset Backed Security or Mortgage Backed Security market activities. Out o f the 
33 respondents, 85% indicated that their companies never participate in any MBS 
market activities, and 15% indicated that their companies only participate in MBS 
activities occasionally. Types o fMBS used by them were CMO, Mortgage Backed 
Bonds and Mortgage Pass-Throughs. About half of the respondents reported that the 
primary use ofMBS is hedging. Other reasons for using MBS included fixed stream of 
payment, capital / asset ratio improvement and special execution for customer. None 
of the respondents suggested profit-oriented trading as the prime reason for using 
MBS. 
The respondents' attitude towards the future MBS activities in Hong Kong 
was mixed. About 42% of the respondents suggested that they have intention to 
participate in the local MBS activities while 58% reported no intention of participation. 
Regarding the type ofmarket activities for those with intention to participate in MBS, 
about 57% reported trading o fMBS and 43% reported selling of mortgages. For 
those with no intention to participate in any MBS activities, about 16% reported 
company policy as the major reason for non-participation. 
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Considerations for Participation in MBS Market in Hong Kong ( Section I, Question 
7 - 1 1 ) 
For the factors affecting the consideration of participation in local MBS 
market, responses suggest that the overall ranking in decreasing order of importance 
are: (1) Quality ofunderlying mortgages, (2) Credit agency rating, (3) Secondary 
market liquidity and (4) Clear legal issues. In fact, about 64% of the respondents 
indicated quality of the underlying mortgages as the most important criteria. For the 
opinion on the best way for credit enhancement, the ranking in decreasing order of 
effectiveness are : (1) Third party enhancement，(2) Cash / collateral accounts, (3) 
Subordination and (4) Overcollateralisation. About 46% ofthe respondents suggested 
third party enhancement and 30% of the respondents suggested cash / collateral 
accounts as the most effective way of credit enhancement. The results suggested that 
market participants were not entirely comfortable with the more popular 
overcollateralisation and / or subordination approaches found in US or UK markets. 
For the opinion on the factors essential to secondary market liquidity, the results 
suggested the following overall ranking in decreasing order ofimportance : (1) Credit 
rating, (2) Standardisation ofMBS, (3) Transparency of underlying mortgages and 
(4) Clearing / settlement infrastructure. 
Regarding the participant's preference for the type of MBS, only 21 
respondents indicated their choice and 12 respondents simply did not answer the 
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question. Out of the respondents indicating their preference, some 57% reported fixed 
rate MBS as the preferred choice while the remaining suggested floating rate MBS. 
Five respondents gave suggestion on the enhancement ofMBS development in 
Hong Kong. Three of them suggested that promotion and / or education programs 
and two ofthem suggested development of a liquid secondary market. 
Implication of MBS Development on Various Sectors ( Section II，Question 1 - 15 ) 
About 70% of the respondents agreed that MBS could ultimately improve the 
financial intermediation process and bring real benefits to the end customers. 
Respondents generally agreed that MBS could enable loan originators to offer more 
choices to the mortgagors by channelling funds to the housing sector ( 58% agree and 
33% neutral about the idea ). 
The results on the function of mortgage corporation in implementing housing 
policy objectives were unclear ( 52% of the respondents neutral about the idea, 21% 
agree and 27% disagree ). Respondents tended to agree that the development of the 
secondary mortgage market would make more funds available to the property market 
and drive up property prices ( 42% agree, 18% neutral and 27 disagree ). At the same 
time, about 58% of the respondents agreed that development of the secondary 
mortgage market would channel long term funds to the mortgage market and eliminate 
other less healthy forms of financing. 
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Regarding the implication of MBS development to banks, most of the 
respondents generally agreed that mortgage securitization could reduce the 
concentration risk of banks. Yet, there was a tendency of agreement about the 
possible problem of banks over-expanding their loan-books as a result mortgage 
securitization ( 39% agree / strongly agree and 33% neutral ). The overall comment 
also tended to disagree the possible adverse impact of mortgage securitization in 
weakening bank's role by encouraging disintermediation. 
Most respondents disagreed with the following viewpoints : (1) banks are 
unlikely to sell their mortgages due to the emphasis of mortgage lending as prime 
activity, (2) banks need not reduce interest rate risk due to high percentage ofvariable 
rate mortgages, and (3) banks have adequate capital and have no need to sell their 
mortgages to raise capital. It is important to note that most of the banks participating 
in mortgage origination have a similar view as other non-mortgage originating 
companies. 
Most of the respondents agreed that institutional investors would welcome 
MBS to be a form of valuable assets. About 33% of the respondents believed that 
institutional investors would actively participate in the secondary mortgage and about 
58% neutral about the idea, indicating only modest market acceptance. 
Regarding the overall prospect of MBS market in Hong Kong, most of the 
respondents tended to agree that HKMA was going in the right direction in the 
development ofmortgage securities and the market outlook was still good. 
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Demographics of the Respondents ( Section III, Question 1 - 8 ) 
About 52% of respondents came from commercial banks, 27% from 
investment banks and the remaining from asset management firms, brokerage firms and 
other institutional investment companies. About half of the commercial banks were 
involved in mortgage originating activities. Just one investment bank reported 
participating in such activities. 
There is an even spread in the company size ( in terms of corporate asset ) of 
the respondents, with approximately equal number of firms from less than US$500 
Million to over US$ 5 Billion. In the area of corporate income composition, about 
30% of the respondents' suggested that their companies have less than 10% foreign 
income. For the remaining ones, the number of companies with foreign income 
composition between 10% to over 50% range was quite evenly distributed. For the 
length ofbusiness history in Hong Kong, most of the respondents' company have been 




As exploited in the above section，it was seen that the general public had a 
diversified point ofview basically. However, focusing on a microscopic view, it could 
still be concluded that people generally had a “sit-and-see，，attitude. Firstly, most of 
them do not deal with the product currently which is understandable since most of 
them find the product exotic and unfamiliar, it is natural to conceive in this way. To 
summarise, some elements can be improved to make the project of introducing MBS 
smoother. 
Simplicity 
As being pledged by the HKMA, they intend to introduce simple structured 
MBS in the first attempt. In fact, this is proved to be vital. As found out from our 
research, most of the target have little knowledge about MBS products. If this is the 
case, then they would not participate in the trading and marketing activities of the 
MBS and this would in turn lower the volume ofMBS transactions, thus hindering its 
development. 
Going a step fiirther, it would be beneficial to the development process if 
HKMA can organise education in the form of roadshows, seminars or even courses to 
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the target participants in the industry. Not only will this help educating the public but 
will also show the enthusiasm ofHKMA in introducing the product in Hong Kong. 
Credit Rating 
The Government Exchange Fund BiU/Note program has been very successfiil in 
Hong Kong. One of the important reasons for this is the credit ratings for these 
papers. It is very similar to Treasury Bills in US. Therefore, market players feel very 
comfortable and confident with it and those its widely accepted in the market. This is 
actually a sign to HKMA. Confidence of people on a financial products often lies on 
its credit ratings. As reflected by our research result, credit enhancement comes out as 
one of the key component that the public think is important for the development of 
MBS. This is especially true and conforms with the principle behind MBS. As the 
stream of income of MBS comes from the payment of mortgage loans from those 
mortgagees, credit worthiness of these loans become the most critical for determining 
the quality of these MBS products. Therefore HKMA should set up some kinds of 
policies to ensure the high quality of the mortgage loans. 
From a historical perspective, the default rate of mortgage loan in Hong Kong 
is low. To conform with the market practice, however, the mortgage corporation 
should obtain published credit ratings by international rating agencies on their 
securities to help the public in assessing the MBS and to enhance their confidence. 
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A more important reason for credit rating is that it helps investors to price the 
products more accurately. In the world in investment institutions，products of different 
credit ratings have different premium over the risk-free price of Treasury bonds. 
Without an officially accepted rating available in the market, only large institutions 
with internal research team would probably be able to deal with the MBS. This would 
finally hinder its development in Hong Kong. 
Securitised products often obtain a higher rating than that of the seller of the 
assets. However, this is only possible by separating the credit of assets from the credit 
ofthe seller. Rating agencies such as S&P require the transfer of assets to be regarded 
as a "true sale" ofthe assets under applicable law and accounting standards rather than 
a pledge or hypothecation of the assets to achieve the necessary separation. 
It is important to note that credit rating can bring many consequences. Recent 
example is the event in the Thai banking and finance sector. Authorities announced 
measures to restore investor confidence and plans were made for troubled Finance One 
to be acquired by Thai Danu Bank. Thus, it can be seen that although credit rating 
facilitates the market development, it may also lead to adverse effect such as 
downgrade ofrating, if the underlying quality of the securities is getting worse. 
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Standardisation 
The underlying mortgage pool should broadly conform with the benchmark 
pool as this is an important building block for developing a more homogeneous MBS 
product over time. Authorised institutions wishing to securitise their mortgages are 
encouraged to have an early discussion with the HKMA on issues such as balance 
sheet treatment ofthe mortgages and the capital adequacy ratio for the MBS paper. 
As market development is greatly helped by a standardisation ofMBS product, 
collective effort on the part ofmarket participants in reducing the heterogeneity in the 
structure ofMBS and the underwriting standards is considered desirable. 
From the survey results, it is observed market participants prefer simple forms 
of credit enhancement like third party enhancement or cash / collateral. The market 
players are not yet accustomed to more popular overcollateralisation and / or 
subordination approaches found in US or UK markets. 
The results did not show a clear market preference on the type ofMBS ( fixed 
rate or floating rate ). Thus, HKMA may need to do further study on the preference of 
the market participants. 
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Supporting Infrastructure 
Debt market has not been as developed as the equity market in Hong Kong. 
This leads to a greater need for better supporting infrastructure for the development of 
MBS. This includes the legal system, monitoring systems and agents, regulatory 
environment etc. In the current situation, the mortgage corporation was set up by the 
HKMA, and was fiilly backed by the Government. It is therefore anticipated that the 
corporation will set up a clear framework for the development ofit. 
Property market is one ofthe most important element that can affect the MBS 
market, and vice versa. This is so because the mortgage corporation may help to assist 
the implementation of housing policy objectives Close monitoring of the property 
market condition should be beneficial to the MBS development. Since the property 
market condition can greatly affect the mortgage supply ( e.g. the demand and supply 
of flats ), it is important that both markets have a clear and objective communication 
that is always at presence. 
According to the announcement of HKMA, the Ministry of Housing of the 
Government has been appointed a place in the committee in the Mortgage 
Corporation. This is very logical in which a bridge between the two markets was 
established so that both can be more transparent to the other. We will expect to see a 
much deeper influence on the property through the policy ofMBS and vice versa. 
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Secondary Market Liquidity 
Most of the market participants are highly concerned with market liquidity of 
the MBS. HKMA should assist the private sector in developing the secondary 
mortgage market. In considering whether to participate, the Government would need 
to take into account of issues in a wider perspective, including the financial 
implications, the contribution of the corporation to banking stability and to the 
development ofthe debt market, as well as the impact on the property market. HKMA 
will discuss the matter with the relevant branches of Government in the light ofviews 
expressed in the Group. 
Similar policies similar to those in handling the repos can be set out. In that 
way, a market of high liquidity is ensured with the participation of the Mortgage 
Corporation on behalf of HKMA in buying and selling the MBS against the 
participants. This can be done subject to some conditions so that participants can refer 
to the Mortgage Corporation as a last resort when they are in urgent need ofbuying or 
selling, for example due to liquidity problem. 
Marketing Effort 
HKMA should proactively approach authorised institutions that will likely 
securitise their mortgages, on issues such as balance sheet treatment ofthe mortgages 
and the capital adequacy ratio for the MBS paper. 
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CHAPTERIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have looked into the background of the MBS market, the 
characteristics of the product, and the experience of other countries. The factors 
leading to the development o fMBS in Hong Kong, HKMA's mortgage corporation 
plan, and the factors / implications of the MBS development were also discussed. 
In order to reflect the current issues and to suggest improvements for the MBS 
development, an independent survey was carried out which covered most ofthe parties 
that are potential players ofthe MBS market. 
From the survey results，it is found that most corporations and financial 
institutions were not negative view towards the product. Yet, they were not 
completely knowledgeable about the instrument. This is not surprising as debt market 
and debt product have not been well-developed in Hong Kong. This shows a sign to 
HKMA in implementing its project : education of market participants will be essential 
to the success of the MBS development project. 
Thus, HKMA's plan to make simple products in the early stage of development 
to help promoting the product to the public aligns with the survey findings. Due to the 
nature of MBS, standardisation and credit ratings are far more important in 
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determining its value than for other types of products. Rating by standard agents 
would also help its promotion. 
Several recommendations have been identified in this project, and the HKMA is 
in the course of introducing the product with list of the committee members decided. 
This results of this project may well serve the purpose of guiding the way HKMA 
implement the project. The prospect of the MBS market is still quite promising and 
HKMA's development effort is crucial to the success of the MBS. No matter what 
result will turn up, it is important to note that MBS will be an important milestone in 
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APPENDK 
Opinion Survey on Mortgage Backed Securities 
Section I 
Section I asked about the use ofMortgage Backed Securities in the respondent's 
company and the opinion on the critical success factors for MBS development in Hong 
Kong 
1. How often does your firm participate in activities of asset-backed securities (ABS)? 
Frequently Often Occasional Never Total 
Total Number of 0 1 5 21 33 
Respondents 
Percentage 0% 3% 15% 82% 100% 
Response broken down by type of company 
Frequently Often Occasional Never Total 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 0 2 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 0 2 2 
Commercial Bank 0 0 2 15 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 0 2 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 1 2 6 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 0 1 0 1 
Co 
Total Number of 0 1 5 27 33 
Respondents 
2. What kinds of asset-backed securities does your firm deal with ？ 
Type of Asset Backed Securities Number 
Credit Card Receivables 1 
Mortgage Loan Receivables 1 
Lease Account Receivables 1 
Total Number of Respondents 3 
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3. How often does your firm participate in activities of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) ？ 
Response broken down by type of company 
Frequent Often Occasional Never Total 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 0 2 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 0 2 2 
Commercial Bank 0 0 2 15 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 0 2 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 0 2 1 ^ 
Mutual Fund I Insurance Co 0 0 1 9. 1 
T ^ ~ " 0 0 5 28 33 
Percentage 0% 0% 15% 85% 100%_ 
4. Which of the following types of mortgage related securities does your firm participate in ？ 
(may choose more than one) 
Response broken down by type of company 
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage CMOs Total 
Pass- Backed Pay-thru 
Throughs Bonds Bonds 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 0 0 0 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 0 2 2 
Commercial Bank 1 1 0 0 2 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 0 0 0 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 2 0 2 4 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 1 0 0 1 
Co 
Total 1 4 0 4 _ _ _ ? _ 
5. What would be the purpose of dealing with asset-backed securities ？ ( may choose more 
than one) 
Trading for profit-taking 0 
Looking for a steady stream of coupon 2 
payment 
Hedging purpose 5 
Improve capital / asset ratio 2 
Specially executed for customers 2 
Others 9. 
Total number of respondents U 
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l look ingfora Hedging Improve capital / Specially 
steady stream purpose asset ratio executed for 
of coupon customers 
payment 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 0 0 
Brokerage Firm 1 1 0 0 
Commercial Bank 1 1 2 1 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 0 0 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 2 0 1 
Mutual Fund / Insurance Co 0 1 9 5 
Grand Total 2 5 2 2 
6. Does your firm intend to participate in any activities of the mortgage-backed securities to 
be introduced in Hong Kong ？ 
YES NO 
Number of~~ Activities Number of 
respondents respondents 




Asset M g t ~ 1 0 1 0 1 
Company 
Brokerage 2 0 2 0 0 
Firm 
Commercial 8 6 3 0 9 
Bank 
Corporate / 0 0 0 0 2 
Institutional 
Investment 
Investment 2 0 1 1 1 
Bank 
Mutual Fund 1 0 1 0 0 
I Insurance 
Co 
Total 14 6 8 1 1^ 
For the respondents indicating no intention to participate in MBS market activities, three 
mentioned that company policy as the majorreason. 
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7. Please rank the factors below in the order of importance affecting your consideration of 
participating in mortgage-backed securities : (1 = Mostimportant，5=Leastlmportant) 
Credit Quality of Secondary Clear legal Others 
agency underlying market issues 
rating mortgage liquidity 
Rank1 4 18 4 2 1 
Rank2 15 5 8 1 0 
Rank3 7 5 11 6 0 
Rank4 3 1 6 19 0 
Rank 5 0 0 0 0 28 
Average ITl T^ 2.66 3.55 4.86 
Rank 
Note : Total number ofrespondents is 29. One respondent mentioned "transaction costs" 
as the most important criteria. 
8. What do you think will be the best way for credit enhancement of the MBS ？ 
|over- Subordination Third Party Cash / Total 
collateralisatio Enhancement Collateral 
n ^ Acct 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 1 1 2 
Commercial Bank 1 1 5 3 10 
Corporate / 0 0 1 1 2 
Institutional 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 1 5 3 9 
Mutual Fund / 0 1 0 0 1 
Insurance Co 
Total Number of 1 5 12 8 26 
Respondents 
104 
9. Please rank the factors below in the order of importance, which you think will affect the 
secondary market liquidity of the MBS : (1= Most important) 
Standardisation Credi t~~ Transparency Clearing I Listing of 
of MBS rating of underlying settlement securities in 
mortgage pool infrastructure organised 
exchanges 
Rank1 6 ” 5 4 2 
Rank 2 8 4 4 8 5 
Rank3 5 6 10 4 3 
Rank 4 2 5 7 6 8 
Rank 5 7 2 2 6 28 
Average ^ 2.39 2.89 3.07 4.20 
Rank 
Note : Total number ofrespondents is 28. 
10. What is your firm's preferred MBS ？ 
Fixed Rate Floating Rate No Answer Total 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 1 1 2 
CommercialBank 5 4 8 17 
Corporate / Institutional 2 0 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 4 2 3 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance Co 1 0 0 1 
Total 12 9 12 33 
11. What would you suggest to help enhancing the mortgage-backed securities development 
in Hong Kong ？ 
Only 5 respondents answer this question. Three respondents mentioned promotion / 
education programs on MBS and two respondents indicated market liquidity. 
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Section n 
Section II asked about the respondent's personal opinions on implications ofMBS 
development 
Questions 1 -2 deal with the impact of MBS development on customers 
Questions 3 - 5 deal with the impact of MBS development on the property market 
Questions 6 -11 deal with the impact of MBS development on the banking sector 
Questions 12 -13 deal with the impact of MBS development on the debt market 
Questions 14 -15 ask about the respondent's overall view on the MBS market 
The following rate is used for all questions in this section : 




Disagree Strongly 5 
1. MBS can ultimately improve the financial intermediation process, bringing real 
benefits to the customers (e.g. in the form of lower mortgage rate or increased availability of 
mortgage funds) 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 2 0 0 0 2 
CommercialBank 4 9 3 1 0 17 
Corporate / 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Institutional 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 7 2 0 0 9 
Mutual Fund / 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Insurance Co 
Total 4 23 5 1 0 33 




2. MBS can enable loan originators to offer more choices to mortgagors by channelling funds 
to the housing sector 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 0 9 6 2 0 17 
Corporate / 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Institutional 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 5 3 1 0 9 
Mutual Fund / 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Insurance Co 
Total 0 19 11 3 0 33 
Percentage 0% 58% 33% 9% 0% 100% 
Average Score: 
2.52 
3. The mortgage corporation can help to assist the implementation of housing policy 
objectives 
(e.g. through selection of specific types of mortgages to be securities and / or control 
volume of MBS origination ) 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 0 2 0 2 
CommercialBank 0 5 8 4 0 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 2 6 1 0 9 
Mutual Fund / 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Insurance Co 
Total 0 7 17 9 0 33 
Percentage 0% 21% 52% 27% 0% 100% 
Average Score : 3.06 
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4. Development of the secondary mortgage market will make more funds available to 
property market and drive up property prices. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Commercial Bank 2 8 5 2 0 17 
Corporate / 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Institutional 
Investment 
Investment Bank 1 3 0 5 0 9 
Mutual Fund / 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Insurance Co 
Total 3 14 6 9 1 33 
Percentage . 9% 42% 18% 27% 3% 100% 
Average Score : 2.73 
5. Development of the secondary mortgage market will channel long term funds into the 
mortgage market, eliminating some less healthy forms of mortgage funding by real estate 
developers. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 0 5 6 5 1 17 
Corporate / 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Institutional 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 7 2 0 0 9 
Mutual Fund / 0 1 0 0 0 1 
lnsur3AC6 Co 
Total 0 19 8 5 1 33 




6. Mortgage securitization can reduce the concentration risk of banks by reducing the 
proportion of property loans in the loan book. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 4 8 3 2 0 17 
Corporate / 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Institutional 
Investment 
Investment Bank 2 3 3 1 0 9 
Mutual Fund / 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Insurance Co 
Total ~~~ 8 13 9 3 0 33 
Percentage 24% 39% 27% 9% 0% 100% 
Average Score: 
2.21 
7. Mortgage securitization give an incentive for banks to over-expand their loan book in the 
expectation of being able to securitise, thus reducing the quality of mortgages. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 1 5 7 4 0 17 
Corporate / 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Institutional 
Investment 
Investment Bank 1 6 0 2 0 9 
Mutual Fund / 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Insurance Co 
Total 2 11 13 7 0 33 




8. Mortgage securitization will weaken the banks' role by encouraging disintermediation. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 1 1 0 0 0 2 
CommercialBank 0 4 7 5 1 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 2 2 3 2 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance Co 0 0 0 0 1 1 
T ^ 1 7 12 9 4 33 
Percentage 3% 21% 36% 27% 12% 100% 
Average Score : 3.24 
9. Banks consider mortgage-related lending as their core activity have no desire to sell their 
mortgage loans at present. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 0 3 3 10 1 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 3 3 3 0 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Co 
Total 0 8 7 17 1 33 
Percentage 0% 24% 21% 52% 3% 100% 
Average Score : 3.33 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Mortgage Origination 0 1 1 7 0 9 
Non-Mortgage Origination 0 7 6 ]0 1 24 
Total 0 8 7 17 1 33 
Percentage 0% 24% .21% 52% 3% 100% 
Average Score •• 3.33 
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10.Banks will not securitise their mortgages to reduce interest rate risks due to the high 
percentage of adjustable rate mortgages. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 0 2 0 2 
CommercialBank 1 1 7 8 0 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 0 5 4 0 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 0 0 1 0 1 
^2 
Total 2 2 12 17 0 33 
Percentage 6% 6% 36% 52% 0% 100% 
Average Score : 3.33 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Mortgage Origination 1 0 5 3 0 9 
Non-Mortgage 1 2 7 14 0 24 
Origination 
T ^ 2 2 12 17 0 33 
Percentage 6% 6% 36% 52% 0% 100% 
Average Score : 3.33 
11. Banks have adequate capital and have no need to sell their mortgage loans to raise 
capital. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 2 0 0 0 2 
CommercialBank 0 1 5 11 0 17 
Corporate/Institutional 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 2 3 3 1 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 0 1 0 0 1 
^2 
Total 0 7 10 15 1 33 
Percentage 0% 21% 30% 45% 3% 100% 
Average Score : 3.30 
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12. Institutional investors will welcome MBS to be valuable long term assets. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 1 9 6 1 0 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 2 6 1 0 0 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Co 
T ^ 3 19 10 1 0 33 
Percentage 9% 58% 30% 3% 0% 100% 
Average Score: 2.27 
13. Institutional investorswill actively participate in the secondary mortgage market. 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Commercial Bank 1 6 8 2 0 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 4 5 0 0 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 0 1 0 0 1 
^ 
T ^ 1 10 19 3 0 33 
Percentage 3% 30% 58% 9% 0% 100% 
Average Score •• 2.73 
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14. HKMA is going in the right direction by developing the secondary mortgage market in 
Hong Kong 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 2 8 6 1 0 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 2 6 1 0 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Co 
T ^ 2 14 13 3 1 33 
Percentage 6% 42% 39% 9% 3% 100% 
Average Score : 2.61 
15.The future prospect of MBS in Hong Kong will be very good 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Total 
Strongly Strongly 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 1 8 7 1 0 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 3 3 3 0 9 
Mutual Fund I Insurance 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Co 
Total 1 16 11 5 0 33 
Percentage 3% 48% 33% 15% 0% 100% 
Average Score : 2.61 
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Section III 
Section III collects information about demographics of the respondent and his / her 
company 
1. What is the nature of the main business of your company ？ 
Total 
Asset Mgt Company 2 
Brokerage Firm 2 
Commercial Bank 17 
Corporate / Institutional Investment 2 
Investment Bank 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance Co 1 
Total 33 
2. Does your firm participate in mortgage origination to end customers ？ 
Yes [ ^ Total 
Asset Mgt Company 0 2 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 2 2 
CommercialBank 8 9 17 
Corporate I Institutional Investment 0 2 2 
Investment Bank 1 8 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance Co 0 1 1 
Participate in Mortgage Origination 9 24 33 
3. What is the number of employees of your firm in Hong Kong ？ 
Number of employees in Hong Kong Number of Companies 
0 - 1 0 0 5 
100-500 19 
1000 or above 5 
500- 1000 4 
Total 33 
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4. What is the total corporate asset of your firm in Hong Kong ？ 
Less than US$500M US$1B - US$2B - Over Total 
US$5QQM - US$1B US$2B US$5B US$5B 
Asset Mgt Company 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 3 4 2 4 4 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 1 3 2 1 2 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Co 
Total 8 7 6 6 6 33 
5. What is the percentage of foreign income (generated outside Hong Kong ) for your 
company ？ 
hess than~~10% -~~20% -~~30% -~~40% - Over Number of 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 50% firms 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Commercial Bank 8 4 1 1 2 1 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 2 0 2 2 0 3 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
^2 
Grand Total 10 4 5 4 4 6 33 
6. How long has your company been doing business in Hong Kong ？ 
“ Less than 1 - 3 4 - 5 6 - 10 Over 10 Total 
1 year years years years years 
Asset Mgt Company 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Brokerage Firm 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Commercial Bank 0 2 1 3 11 17 
Corporate / Institutional 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Investment 
Investment Bank 0 1 0 1 7 9 
Mutual Fund / Insurance Co 0 0 0 0 _J 1 
Total 0 3 7 4 19 33 — 
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7. Which is yourjob title I position ？ 
Job Title Number of respondents 
Chairman, President, Managing Director 0 
Director, Assistant Director 2 
General Manager 1 
Executive Vice President, Senior Vice 0 
President 





8. Which of the following best describe your job area ？ 
Job Area Number of respondents 
General Management 0 
Fund / Portfolio Management 6 
Securities Trading 3 
Sales / Marketing 5 
Corporate Finance 5 
Treasury 8 
Merchant Banking 1 
Others 5 
Total 33 
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